8.8.03

The Left Alliance SLD-UP in Poland

Søren Riishøj, senior lecturer, Institute of Political Science, University of South Denmark

This article attempts to shed light on the transformation of the Polish Left and the formation of the left alliance SLD and its cooperation with “little sister” on the Left, the Works Union (UP). In 1989 few observers, if any, were able to forecast the post-communist political come-back just four years after the democratic break-through and the land slide victory of the Solidarity movement at the 1989 semi-free election. In the Baltic countries a “post-communist” political comeback took place only in Lithuania. The post-communist comeback in Poland in 1993 was due to structural as well as institutional, actor-behavioural and policy factors. Also the problems on the Polish Right has to be taken in consideration, not least the significance of the several “wars in the top” on the Right, i.e. the actor-behavioural level.

Opposite on the Polish Right the left alliance SLD succeeded transforming itself first to a functional alliance, later to a standard political party. The successful transformation of the SLD and the alliance with the Works Union (UP) has been a stabilizing factor in Polish politics moving from extraordinary to more ordinary politics. In 2002 both the president institution (Kwasniewski) and the government were SLD strongholds, however, the 2001 election and development in Polish politics after the election signified a change towards populism, thus raising new obstacles for the political stability and further consolidation of democracy.

At the same time the popularity of the SLD-led government and not least the prim minister Leszek Miller sharply decreased mainly due to “bad governance” and serious problems on the actor-behavioural, e.g. political scandals, and policy level, in this case mainly problems regarding the economic policy.

The demise of PZPR and the formation of SLD

In a path dependency and structural perspective the Polish transition has been closely linked to “the philosophy” of the round table discussions (“Magdalenka”) 1988-89, and “the Balcerowicz plan I”. No Polish governing parties have been able to liberate themselves from the legacy of Magdalenka and the Balcerowicz plan despite proclamations about doing so by some parties on both the Right and the Left. Furthermore, as a surprise for many observers, earlier than expected the new governments’ political capital was considerably reduced, mostly due to the many “wars in the top” between and inside the anticommunist parties. Thus short time after the fight against the old system had been won the social experience from working as activists in opposition to the communist system, phrases like “civil society against the state” and the image of a united society fighting against the communist authorities and their imperial supporters were no longer the most decisive.

Just after the demise of the old system the Left was in need of a new vision, a new political discourse. At that time the Left was divided in different political groupings. The left wing parties in the CEECs can been divided into at least three parts, first authentic historical parties such as the Czech CSSD, second post-communist “successor” parties and, third, non-reformed and partly reformed communist parties such as KSCM. SLD and its political core until 1999, SdRP, belonged to the second group. SDL was founded in July 1990 as an election alliance consisting of more than 20 different left wing groups. Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, the later Prime Minister, and Aleksander Kwasniewski, the later president, belonged to the initiators. SdRP were established after a split inside the old communist party (PZPR) that took place after the round table negotiations with Solidarity. The decision about the foundation of SLD shall also be seen in the context of the preparations of the party to the first free election in 1991. SLD was established in an “exogenous” way as the party was linked to social groups in society with a share in the old system, and in an “endogenous” as the foundation of SLD was caused by the split inside the ruling communist party (PZPR).

At the first congress about 1.000 PZPR delegates took the decision to join the new Republic of Poland’s Social democratic Party (SdRP). In spite of loss of many members the new party SdRP emerged as rather institutionally strong. Three years after the foundation 6,000 had joined SLD and 1,500 the social democratic youth organisation (“Socjaldemokratyczna Frakcja Mlodych”). At he same time Tadeusz Fiszbach, the then party secretary in Gdánsk, formed his own party, Poland’s Social democratic Union (PUS). However, that party ceased to exist before the end of the contractual parliament and therefore did not run for the election in 1991. The main problem was weak organization and lack of money.

After the defeat at the election in 1989 nothing suggested that SLD should be a strong factor in Polish politics. However, with the “wars in the top” inside Solidarity and the right camp, the prospects of the new party federation became brighter. At the 1990 presidential election the SLDs candidate, Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, gained about 10 pct. of the votes, a figure that at that time was considered as satisfactory. In the longer run SLD could not primarily be kept alive by the support from the old power elite and socially deprived. SLD had to gain votes also from former Solidarity-voters and young people who resisted growing catholic fundamentalism and put forward demands about freer access to abortion and equal opportunities for men and women. The economic policy line of the political parties was considered as less significant, as the socio-economic problems by most people seemed impossible to solve and the differences between the political parties unimportant.

At the time of the foundation SLD consisted of 33 different groupings. Among the most important we find The Republic of Poland’s Social Democracy (SdRP), and among the other political groups

· Piotr Ikonowicz’ Poland’s Socialist Party (PPS)

· Women’s Democratic Union

· Poland’s Green Party

· The Association Wisla-Oder

· New Democracy

· The trade union OPZZ and some branch trade unions

Also the Independent European Initiative (NIE) and the orthodox political association “Proletaryat” joined the SLD. After some time “Proletaryat”, it was calculated, would constitute a more politically liberal association and thus join the party line. However, that did not happen, therefore before long the influence of “Proletaryat” decreased. The ideology, however, basically remained the same, therefore in 1998 the “Proletaryat” took the decision to leave SLD. Furthermore it has to be taken in consideration that individuals without a formal belonging to SLD was “adopted” in the party and played a political role.

The Polish Socialist Party (PPS) was rooted in the old Polish Social Party (PPS), a patriotic socialist party established before WWI. PPS joined SLD shortly before the 1993 election. Evidence showed that the PPS was not able to obtain parliamentary representation by going alone due to the low voter support and the high threshold requirement (five percent). PPS’ participation was important as SLD tried to loosen the bonds to the communist past and constitute a democratic and relevant political party. However, the decision to join SLD was not taken unanimously, e.g. it was resisted by Grzegorz Ilkas London-based wing in PPS. Later, when SLD became a unified standard party, PPS and Ikonowicz took the decision to leave the SLD.

Back in the 1980s the OPZZ, also a part of SLD, had been the only legal trade union in Poland. After 1989 OPZZ tried to present itself as a trade union in the classical social-democratic sense without like Solidarity links to the church and the right wing groups. Since 1989 OPZZ has gained more members than Solidarity. Inside SLD trade union OPZZ, like PPS, represented the trade union policy line. Therefore OPZZ criticized what was called the SLD-PSL-government’s too “liberal” policy line. In some cases the party discipline was broken, e.g. at voting on the budget, leading to the exclusion of the vice-chairman Stanislaw Wisniewski from SLD in 1994. Roughly speaking OPZZ contained two different “factions”, one aiming to “politize” the trade union according to the “Solidarity model”. OPZZ should be integrated in the Left “milieu” in Poland and secure its own political representation (“Ruch Ludzi Pracy”). Another faction wanted to run a stricter trade union line without too much “politisation”. Also at the presidential election in 1990 OPZZ was divided into two different groups. Some from OPZZ supported UDs candidate Tadeusz Mazowiecki, other factions SLD’s Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz.

A rapprochement with SdRP took place short time before the 1991 election, with the result that also OPZZ took the decision to join the party-federation SLD. At the 1991 election 66 candidates from OPZZ were elected to the parliament. Contrary to Solidarity OPZZ usually supported SLD and refused to take part in the different anti-government demonstrations organized by Solidarity. While Solidarity alternately supported and criticized its “own” government, OPZZ acted as a loyal link to the working class calling upon the classical social democratic tradition. SLD adopted a distinct instrumental attitude to OPZZ. The bonds between AWS and Solidarity were clearly closer than those between the trade union OPZZ and the party federation SLD. Opposite in the case of the formation of SLD, the foundation of election alliance AWS in 1996 was primarily the work of the trade union Solidarity (“S”)[1].

In the end the differences between the two biggest trade unions, Solidarity and OPZZ, remained insuperable. Solidarity joined bilateral negotiations with the SLD led government only in case three-party commissions between the government, the employers and the trade unions were established without the participation of OPZZ. The prospects for a functional social dialogue in Poland were bleak, not only because of problems on the trade union side, but also due to the weak institutionalisation among employers. Solidarity persistently accused OPZZ of being a non-authentic spokesman of workers interests referring to OPZZ´ close cooperation with “the post-communists”. Opposite, the willingness of OPZZ to join corporative structures proposed by the government was low under Solidarity rule. Under the Solidarity led governments OPZZ even in some cases cooperated with populist “protest groups” like Solidarnosc 80 and “Selfdefence” (Samoobrona).

The SLD leaders were mainly recruited from the reform-minded part of the old nomenklatura. Inside the reform-minded part of the old communist party (PZPR) a specific nomenklatura-capitalist milieu had come forward. Also the later president Aleksander Kwasniewski and his wife belonged to that milieu. Thanks to nomenklatura positions these people were in possession of a considerable political experience and personal networks, also the financial basis was relatively strong. The support for market economy was widespread, not only on the elite level, but also among several party supporters and party members. The voter support was broad, therefore SLD could be considered as a class party in the classical sense. Aiming to be recognized as a relevant party SLD tried to appeal to as many social groups as possible, i.e. to present itself as a distinct catch-all party.

In the first semi-democratic contract parliament the communist obtained 171 members, all were elected thanks to rules and laws governing the semi-free election in 1989. The then SLD parliamentary group consisted of 28 different groups, but opposite AWS the leadership of SLD was maintained a high party discipline at voting in parliament. In the first years after the foundation SLD was politically isolated, mostly considered as a non-relevant anti-systemic political party. The bad result at the May 1990 local elections signified that the party might be wiped out from the party political scene. From almost two million members the number of party members decreased to just 20,000. SLDs leadership expected that the round table agreement would give SdRP and SLD three to four years’ breathing space, enough to carry through the socio-economic reforms introduced by the Messner and Rakowski governments. SLD also needed some years to carry through its own internal transformation. According to the plans the cooperation with Solidarity and the church that had started during the round table talks, should be maintained, also the political consensus about the transition to market economy. In other words, more time was needed for consolidation; therefore the question about taking over the government responsibilities was not the decisive, at least not in the short run.

At the beginning of the 1990s the marginalization of SLD in the parliament was partly broken as SLD became represented in the Radio and TV council. After Aleksander Hall’s defection from Democratic Union (UD), SLD became the greatest single political party in the Sejm. At some important voting in parliament SLD took the decision to support the Solidarity led Suchocka-government, e.g. in case of proposals about non-confidence to the government. In addition, some important law proposals passed the parliament only because of “silent acceptance” from the SLD.

After the round table negotiations, and with the ongoing changes in Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin wall many non-communist leaders put question marks at the value of the round table agreement. The need of a broad political consensus had simply dissipated. Therefore SLD came under more pressure from extreme right wing groups, and even from groups that had taken part in the round table discussions. Under those new circumstances SLD was forced to change its strategy.

The pressure from outside fostered more internal solidarity and party discipline. On the institutional level and unlike inside Solidarity the “wars in the top” on the Left took place before 1989. With the transition to normal politics, political experience, financial means, disciplined members and voters were more decisive than the attitudes to the communist past. From the beginning SLD owned its own buildings and ran its own party offices. However, party buildings might be taken over by the authorities. The situation in the right wing parties and other groupings on the Left was different, e.g. in the badly institutionalised Poland’s Social democratic Union (PUS) and The Works Union (UP). Those parties had to pay more for rent of offices and therefore were in need of party members and financial means.

Moving to the actor-level, at the 1993 election SLD gained more electoral support because of the many ”wars in the top” inside the Solidarity camp. SLD tried to avoid using the abstract and destructive ideological debates which were dominating on the Right and instead focused on concrete and single issue policy subjects. During the 1993 election campaign SLD underlined professionalism, experience and pragmatism, tying to appeal to so many social groups in society as possible, thereby “serving the whole society” and presenting itself for the outside world as a professionally led catch-all party.

On the policy level, the increasing electoral support was caused by the widespread disappointment because of the economic reform, especially increasing unemployment and ways and means of privatisations, the closing down of state enterprises, the too big influence of the church, the interference of the president (Lech Walesa) in governmental affaires and the advance of the new post-Solidarity led “nomenklatura”. Non-economic topics seemed to be most significant for the Left[2].

Thus SLD passed its own transformation and seemed to appear as an authentic social democratic party of the western type. Kwasniewski acted as the leading strategist behind the transformation of “communists to Socialdemocrats”. Both as a party leader and as president Aleksander Kwasniewski worked energetically for “modernisation” and “europeisation” of the Polish Left. In the SLD-PSL government the SLD acted as the most pro-European and pro-market party. SLDs participation in government was no obstacle for Polish membership of NATO and the EU. In 2003 Kwasniewski was even mentioned as one of the candidates for the post as head of NATO. Nonetheless for historical reasons SLDs coalition potential remained low, especially as regards cooperation with post-Solidarity parties.

After the 1993 election Aleksander Kwasniewski tried to include the Workers Union (UP) and the Freedom Union (UW) in government by underlining the small policy and ideological differences. In the end UP took the decision to be in opposition. The SLD-PSL-government’s majority in parliament was gained primarily due to waste of votes on the Right and the high treshold requirements.

The cooperation between SLD and PSL in government was far from frictionless, and in the final stage something like an internal dissolution took place. The Peasant Party (PSL) even put forward a proposal of non-confidence to its “own” SLD-PSL government. SdRP and SLD appealed to broader groups in society than PSL, was less market-sceptical and behaved less “secteric” to the public. In fact working in government SLD did what was promised the voters before the previous election. For that reason a new slogan “We kept what we promised” was launched with some success under the 1997 election campaign. The economic programme “A Strategy for Poland”, introduced by finance minister Grzegorz Komodo, spoke about more employment, social partnership and state regulation. On institutional level, a three-party Commission had been established already under the Suchocka government. The establishment of the new social pact took place in the shape of a three party discussion forum consisting of representatives from employers, trade unions and government.

As noticed by Lena Kolarska-Bobinska an inclination in the Polish population to swing to the left under right wing government has been observed, at the beginning of the 1990s and in late 1999 reflected in low support for privatisation of state enterprises[3]. Many shared the opinion that “Poland does not have the type of market economy that we expected” (in 1989), and mainly for that reason voted “post-communist”. Opposite, the public support for privatisations and market economy has been greatest under “post-communist” rule such as was the case in the years between 1993 and 1997.

The 1997 election

Before the 1997 election some observers talked about three currents inside SLD:

· a social-liberal supported by Aleksander Kwasniewski

· a centrist supported Jozef Oleksy

· finally a more dogmatic supported by the trade union OPZZ and minister for labour, Leszek Miller[4].

The social-liberal group abandoned Marxist Leninist thinking, instead arguing in favour of market economy and political capitalism with favourable conditions for “nomenklatura entrepreneurs”. The “social-liberal versus orthodox” divide, however, was not razor-sharp and changing over time. Since the take over of the post as chairman of the SLD Leszek Miller has followed a pragmatic policy line, appealing to the new middle class and supporting market economy and Polish membership of NATO and the EU, even supporting the US war against Iraq. The left profile was mostly expressed in attitudes to the church and the communist past. The majority of those voting SLD were critical to the church attitudes to e.g. the abortion laws, the questions about inequality between man and woman and the obligatory religious instruction in schools and other forms of church interference in political life.

The social composition of SLDs voters has been changing over time. At the 1991 election SLD gained 13-14 pct. of the votes among the best educated, only surpassed by Democratic Union (UD), the later Freedom Union (UD). The support among students was lower (5.7) and SLD was also short of votes from workers and women. At the 1993 election 20 pct. of the well-educated voted SLD, 13 pct. among the lower educated and also 20 pct. among the lowest educated. More interesting, at the 1997 election 23 pct. of private entrepreneurs voted SLD, making SLD the strongest party also in that social group. The liberal Democratic Union (UD) had to content itself with 18 pct. In other words, in step with the stronger voter support the social support became broader. In 2000 SLD had the greatest electoral support in all bigger social groups and opposing the Buzek-government succeeded to maintain the profile as a professionally led and well institutionalized catch-all party. In other words, measured by social support SLD cannot be considered as a class party (Knuzewski, 1998:152). SLD had many loyal voters; the alternative for many SLD voters has been not to take part in the elections.

In spite of different factions SLD constituted a disciplined party-alliance, in part because of the pressure from outside, e.g. the demands for de-communisation (“dekomunizacja”). The fact that SLD had a well-organized institutional core in the shape of the SdRP, was also an important factor. Under no circumstances SLD could have survived the defection of the SdRP, but opposite only a few noticed that the Association of Polish Communists Proletariat (“Zwiazek Kommunistow Polskich Proletariat”) took the decision to leave SLD in 1998.

Working in opposition, SLD mostly focused on single issues, also gaining electoral support because of the “wars in the top” inside AWS. Many welcomed Leszek Miller’s appeal to stop what he called the Polish peoples “war among themselves”. According to Leszek Miller the electorate would reward politicians and parties who actively aim at concrete policy results and political stability such as was the case when SLD actively took part in the negotiations about adoption of the new Polish constitution[5].

Edmund Wnuk Lipinski characterised SLDs policy-line in opposition as meritocratic (“opposition merytoryczna”)[6]. The meritocratic policy differs from the traditional opposition policy, in which case the goal is not to change the government proposals to the better, but more to gain voters through persistent critique of the proposals presented from government side. The meritocratic policy line was striking e.g. in the case the debates about the future administrative reform, health reform and pension and education reforms; all the reforms were introduced by the AWS-UW-government.

Former leader of the Works Union (UP) Rychard Bugaj considered SLD as heterogeneous with a both broad and vague political programme, giving the party considerable freedom of manoeuvre and make it possible to change attitudes in special cases. No big differences can be observed between the political Right and SLD as regards the economic programmes. In stead, the political battles moved to other arenas. Issues such as the freedom of man and fight against nationalism seems to replace economic slogans, globalisation had curtailed freedom of manoeuvre in the economic policy. Like other parties the Left has been forced to adhere to “path-dependency”, as no realistic alternatives could be found to market economy, the adaptation to the EU and US and globalisation.

From party federation to standard party

The plans about converting SLD from a party federation to a unified “standard” party were not new, but the process was speeded up after to the adoption of the 1996 constitution, in which it was stated that only parties and election committees could take part in the elections, and that candidate are nominated by political parties. Therefore the “old” SLD might not be able to take part in the 2001 election. Hence, since the autumn of 1998 the party leader Leszek Miller spoke in favour of dissolving the old election alliance SLD and instead forming a political party in the normal “standard” sense.

The transformation of SLD took place without much trouble at least we compare with the AWS. 149 out of 164 SLD-members of Sejmen and 25 out of 28 senators joined the new party. The trade union members had to join SLD on an individual basis. Plans were circulating to let the new party leadership be elected by a party referendum, however, but in the end that plan was abandoned. An organizational innovation was the establishment of a political programme council (“rada polityczno-programowa”) consisting of party members as well as individuals representing different organisations in society willing to cooperate somehow with SLD. Non-party candidates could also be found on SLD’s list at elections, even representatives from religious organizations. The programme council’s main task was to put forward a political programme and bring a new profile to the party. Among the 32 groups in the “old” federation only five refused to join the new party SLD.

However, the closing down of the party alliance SLD did not take place without critique. PPS’ leader Piotr Ikonowicz refused to join a unitary political party, insisting that SLD should remain a party federation. Some dissatisfied even took the decision to join Samobrona. It seemed impossible to close down a party like PPS that had existed in almost 100 years. However, PPS’ options outside the SLD were few. To be represented in parliament had been the prime motive to join SLD. The withdrawal of PPS had no negative consequences for SLD as a whole, but PPS’ views had some support inside the alliance. Many in SLD considered PPS and the chairman Piotr Ikonowicz as an embarrassment because of an uncompromising policy line. Under communism Piotr Ikonowicz had worked as a political dissident, but after 1989 he persistently defended the classical trade union values and criticised SLD because of its rapprochement to the liberal Freedom Union (UW). Also the SLD “apparatchik” Leszek Miller was criticized because of a too social liberal and pro-western policy line.

Most critique came from the party newspaper “Trybuna”, directed against Leszek Miller who according to his opponents behaved in dictatorial ways and not being able to present consistent and politically realisable political alternatives to the policy of the government. Therefore SLD risked being a non-ideological party without realistic policy alternatives for the electorate. As regards the actor level former Prime Minister Mieczyslaw F. Rakowski expressed the opinion that SLD have several intelligent leaders and many experienced administrators with a profound knowledge about governmental and public affairs[7]. But SLD has become a “party of social democrats in smoking” with a distinct market economic and EU-integrationistic profile. The problem is that SLD seems to forget those problems that troubles people in their every day life, instead it has been focusing on unimportant “apparatus talk” and becoming a party of technocratic modernizers, equated with secular pro-Europeanism and the imitation of all things modern and pro-European Union. According to Rakowski the question about transforming SLD to a unitary standard political party clearly belonged to the unimportant apparatus talk, but unfortunately in the minds of the party leaders that question had the highest priority. According to the critics, the new party was governed top-down according to a new-old type post-communist leninist principle about democratic centralism.

In the new party also different views came forward about the procedures connected with the foundation of the new SLD. One group expressed the opinion that a broad discussion about the party programme should take place before establishment of the new party organisation. According to that group the work on policy level was most important. The other group argued that a well functioning organisation and the establishment of a well-disciplined party apparatus, i.e. the institutional level, should have first priority. Former presidential candidate for SLD and former Prime Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz kept a low profile, but indirectly he supported the first group. In an interview in the Polish weekly “Polityka” he expressed the opinion that the new SLD under no circumstances should move in the direction of a centralistic governed unitary party. In stead the highest priority should be given a free, open and democratic debate[8].

Most difficult was the closing down of The Republic of Poland's Social Democratic Party (SdRP), the old federation’s strongest political group. It has even been argued that since 1989 SdRP had been SLDs “salvation”. In the first years it had demanded much courage and willpower to join SLD. At that time SDL was exposed to heavy attacks from almost all other parties. Nonetheless, after the closing down of the old SLD people with a background in the SdRP did not obtain privileges compared with those who joined the party after the election defeats of Solidarity and later the AWS.

The new SLDs organisational structure and political programme was adopted at the first congress in December 1999. At the founding congress SdRP, the “core party”, had to take the decision to dissolve itself. The party members and the members of parliament should decide whether to join the new party on an individual basis. By Polish standard women were well represented in the interim leadership as 8 out of 27 were women. Furthermore, at the first congress it was decided that women should constitute at least 30 pct. of the candidates to elections, increasing to 50 pct. in the year 2007.

Also representatives from the new coordinating groups on voivod-level were included in the party leadership. Furthermore, important posts were given to former members of the Freedom Union (UW). Andrzej Celinski, a former member of both UW and KOR, later Minister of Culture, was elected as chairman for the commission that should prepare the new SLDs first political programme. The election of Andrzej Celinski was a tactical move, as it was hoped that the choice of Andrzej Celinski should remove what SLD called “the most irrational in Polish politics”, the division of the Polish population in “we” (i.e. Solidarity) versus “them” (i.e. the “post-communists”)[9]. Not all groups were represented in the new party leadership. Jerzy Urban’s organisation NIE (“Niezalezna Inicjatywa Europejska”) requested that, but his demand was refused.

The new SLD leadership hoped to obtain at least 100,000 party members, held up by the increase in electoral support. October 1999 21,000 people had taken the decision to join the new SLD on individual basis, increasing to 60.000. After that no legal connection existed between the old and new SLD. To the unsolved problems belonged the party debt, so before closing down the old SLD the new SLD had to pay 2.5 mil zloty to the Polish state.

At the congress Leszek Miller was elected as new chairman of SLD almost unanimously. The election of five vice-chairmen was met with more excitement. Here Leszek Miller also had his own way, as one woman (Lybacka), a representative from OPZZ, and Andrzej Clinks, the defector from UW, were elected together with the then vice-chairmen for the Sejm (Borowski) and Jerzy Szmajdzinski, also a close friend of Miller. Surprisingly for most observers, the former Premier Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz was not elected as one of the new vice chair persons. Furthermore, the new party organization was divided in 160 local units and with 16 “coordinators” on the voivod-level.

The aim was to obtain the best territorial coverage as possible. As noted above, after the establishment of a unitary standard party collective membership was replaced by individual membership. Also members of OPZZ had to join the new SDL on an individual basis. The admission of new members took place after talks with each applicant. About one third were former members of PZPR, however, we also find many young people. In the 1980s most of former members of PZPR had been reform-minded communists, representing those groups in the ruling communist party (PZPR) who in the 1980’s had supported the round table negotiations with the opposition.

Wojciech Pielecki argued that young people joined the party not because of the attitudes to the past, but because of their personal conviction about Poland’s future. The history was left to the historians[10]. Therefore, SLD can no longer be considered as a party that only appeals to pensioners and former communists. 60 pct. of those voting SLD in the late 1990s were under 40 years old and therefore had no stake in the old system. Also a political learning had taken place since 1989. The “new-olds’ political choice was based on a pragmatic almost value free considerations. Many engaged in the private sector voted Solidarity at the first free elections. Later they changed their opinion and left Solidarity disappointed because of bad the political style and the wrong policy-line.

That the communist past no longer played a big role was, according to Pielecki, primarily due to psychological factors. On the discourse level a de-freezing had taken place, at least partly. A more “cool” evaluation of the past, also the period of real socialism, was badly needed. People were overwhelmed by so many great and fast changes in society that the memories of the time before 1989 receded in the background. Therefore “a new authentic thick line” towards the past has needed after the Spanish model after Franco. That would foster new and more fruitful political alliances, maybe even a historical compromise between SLD and the Freedom Union (UW). In principle SLDs coalition potential was great, the barriers for entering a historical compromise with the Freedom Union (UW) were primarily historical, i.e. the structural, only to a small extent policy-related.

At the 2001 election no less than 3.5 mio. young Poles could vote for the first time in their life. Therefore all political parties tried to appeal to the young voters who too often “chose the sofa”, i.e. did not move to the ballot box. According to public opinion polls about 40 pct. of the first time voters preferred SLD. Thus SLD also became the “party of the youth”. SLD obtained greatest support in all social groups irrespective of sex, age, education, means, working place and home place. At earlier elections the majority of best educated had voted on the Freedom Union (UW), now the majority voted SLD. SLD’s then worst political rival, the election alliance AWS, had its greatest electoral support among elder people, private entrepreneurs and people with short education and training.

The founding congress

The programme proposal put forward just before the 1999 founding congress underlined that no “third ways” existed between planned economy and market economy. As put by the chairman for the programme commission, Andrzej Celinski, the pathway in the economic policy was laid already in the “Balcerowicz plan I”, set in motion shortly by the first Solidarity-led government in 1989. After that had happened only minor adjustments in that plan were possible. In fact, only small policy differences existed between the neo-liberal Leszek Balcerowicz and the left wing economist and former finance minister Marek Belka. Nevertheless, Celinski argued, the Left is obliged to give the socially weakest in society a new chance and equalise the far too big regional differences in welfare.

The political declarations stressed that SLD should link itself to the historical traditions in the Polish and European socialist movement, the traditions going back to the political thinking on the European Left at the beginning of the century. The day-to-day politics should be based on the interaction between patriotism, independence and protection of human and social rights. On that basis the party should include in its programmes the principles about social justice, freedom and self-government.

The attitudes to the past was much debated at the founding congress and therefore followed with great attention. In the programme proposal the crimes of Stalinism and the lack of democracy deplored with references to the “economic pathology” of real socialism and the limitations in fundamental civil rights. In one of the resolutions SLD dissociated itself from the “communist totalitarianism’s crimes” that “had offended the ideals of the Left”. The party was also ready to pay economic compensation to victims of Stalinism. According the Leszek Miller the evaluation of the communist past should be “severe, but fair”. Nevertheless, it was said, SLD appreciate those, who under the old system honestly contributed to more material wealth in Poland through their hard work

The exact formulations of the programme were heavily discussed during the congress. Those formulations adopted, did not satisfy the Right, primarily because the political and economic conditions before 1989 were not mentioned directly in the resolutions. Before the congress opened and, without the SLD-leaderships knowledge, Aleksander Kwasniewski had read out through a spokesman a letter to the delegates, in which he asked to break with the past not only symbolically but radically and in-depth. The questions concerning the responsibility for the mistakes in the past were reactivated when AWS’ presented the parliament for a law proposal tightening the previous lustration-laws. That proposal was, however, refused by the majority in the parliament, including UW. Had the proposal from AWS been adopted in parliament, it no doubt would have been met by a veto from the president primarily because of the legal problems included in the law proposal. Thus despite its size and the internal transformation SLD remained an axis of polarisation in Polish politics.

Unification of the Left

Crucial for SLD was to limit waste of votes on the Left. Therefore SLD offered Workers Union (UD) to nominate candidates on the party’s lists at the next election, scheduled to take place in autumn 2001. According to opinion polls UP risked not to be represented in parliament, like in 1997 gain between four and five percent of the votes as at the 1997 election. Furthermore, as regards seats in parliament small parties were underrepresented due to the election law. Thus election cooperation with SLD would be beneficial to the UP also as far as the number of seats in parliament was concerned.

Much has been said about the need of more unification on the Left. A federation and a common election block were proposed consisting of SLD, UP, PPS and some other minor left groupings, e.g. “Ruch Ludzi Pracy”[11]. “Ruch Ludzi Pracy” had some political links to OPZZ, however, in spite of that the political influence was low. In spring 1999 UP proposed what it called “round table discussions of the Left”, during which the different groups on the Left might discuss ideas and programme proposals from the different left groups. In that connection the former Prime Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz raised two crucial questions: How to combine higher economic growth with the demands on the Left about more social justice? And: Has the Left any freedom of manoeuvre at all in the economic policy taking in consideration globalisation and, not to forget, the adaptation to the EU?[12]

The idea to create more unity on the Left was accepted also by SLD. In 1993 SLD had presented the idea, inviting all important left parties and groups to a “big debate” on the Left about alternatives to the economic policy followed by the post-Solidarity governments. Important was to obtain the greatest as possible electoral support for Aleksander Kwasniewski as president. More cooperation among the different parties and groups on the Left could be helpful to achieve that goal.

However, the plans about the formation of one single united election platform could not be realized[13]. Instead Leszek Miller spoke about the need to establish an “opposition forum” (“Forum Opozycyjne”) that - with SLD as the leading force – would be able to unite the different parties and groups in opposition to Jerzy Buzek’s government[14]. The discussions about more unity on the Left were not the most important for SLD. Under all circumstances SLD remained the most important single party on the Left. Thus mainly for tactical reasons SLD took part in the “round table discussions”, as UP might be a decisive factor in the negotiations after the 2001 election about the construction of a new left wing government. Only few meetings took place, nonetheless the political rapprochement between SLD and UP went on and in the end resulting in an agreement about close cooperation at the 2001 election and with common candidate lists and a common political programme.

Important was not to repeat the mistakes made by the former left wing government (from 1993 to 1997). Evidence from the time of SLD-PSL-government 1993-1997 showed that a government led by SLD may have difficulties when taking controversial but necessary policy decisions, e.g. concerning pensions and the health sector. During the previous SLD-PSL government also plans for administrative reforms were circulating, however, the final decision about the reform was never taken. The AWS led government made those controversial decisions, which were left over from the former government, but did not pay sufficient attention to the quality of the law making process and implementation.

The prospect of formation of a new centre-left government was facilitated by the cooperation between SLD, UP and PSL at the local elections in 1998. After that election 9 of the 16 voivods were led by SLD, and 135 of the 235 powiaty’s had a mayor from the SLD. In spite of favourable election polls SLD did not show any interest in a new parliamentary election before the 2000 presidential election. On policy level the Buzek government was heavily criticized, but SLD distanced itself from strikes and protest demonstrations organized by trade union OPZZ and “Samoobrona”.

The 2001 election

At the 2001 election SLD failed to win a majority in the Sejm, but became the “hegemonic” party in the new coalition government. In addition, it had the control over the Senate, and a close cooperation with the president (Kwasniewski). But like in 1993, SLD was forced to cooperate with the internally split Polish Peasants’ Party (PSL) which after the 2001 election came under heavy fire from the populist farmers movement Samoobrona (“Self-defence”).

At the 2001 election SLD could profit from the AWS-UW government’ mistakes on policy-level, especially the bad implementation of the “four big reforms”, most of all the reform of the health sector. One of the slogans during the 2001 election campaign was: “We (i.e. SLD) can do it (i.e. the same) better”. That slogan was less radical than the one used at the election in 1993 (“It can not go on in that way”).

In the year 2001 more than half of the municipalities and regions were led by SLD or SLD-led coalitions. A “historical compromise” between SLD and Freedom Union (UW) was still unrealistic, but some “defectors” from UW joined SLD. At the New Year 2000-2001 the majority of the Polish people considered SLD as a relevant party and as a party ready to take over governmental responsibilities. The communist past was no longer seen as a barrier for the formation of a new centre-left government. The new left government’s greatest problem was that the macroeconomic problems, not least the unemployment, were increasing and the room of manoeuvre in the economic policy was small due to the macroeconomic problems, the deficit on the state budget and the adaptation to the EU.

Thus at the turn of the century SLD appeared as a well institutionalized political party with a distinct professional catch-all profile. The party could lean on an extensive professionalism and political experience and the ability of strategic planning. SLD’s candidate Aleksander Kwasniewski had been re-elected at the 2000 presidential election. SLD was no longer just a party consisting mainly of veterans from the communist era, just opposite as it had liberated itself from the influence of extreme groups, e.g. “Proletaryat” and “PPS Ikonowicza”. In addition, SLD could profit from the existence of a “hard core” of activists, supporters and important personal networks (Miller, 1999:167-168).

On the structural level the significance of the historical past was underlined several times. The structural pressure and PZPR’s position enhanced the fractionalization inside the PZPR, after the fall of the Berlin wall a regular division of the party took place and the establishment of the new party federation SLD and several other new parties and groups on the Left. After 1989 the structural pressure, the demise of the Soviet Union and transition to unipolarity fostered a more anti-communist line on the Right, but at the same time also more discipline and cohesion inside the SLD.

On the institutional level SLD succeeded transforming itself to a functional party federation, later to a unitary standard political party, and became accepted as a member of the social democratic Socialist International (SI). In that connection the political experience from the time of late real socialism played a crucial role. The party discipline was reinforced because of the structural pressure (“the legacy of the past”) and the aim to be accepted by the Polish society and the West. Thus the problems on actor level seemed to be modest due to the great cohesion on elite level and the high professionalism. Thus the transition from an election alliance to a standard party took place relatively smoothly and without negative consequences as far as electorate support is concerned, just the opposite was the case. At least compared with AWS, SLD was confronted with few problems; however, the facade of unity and cohesion could hardly be maintained after taking over governmental responsibilities.

On policy level SLD became the best intepreter of the “post-communist mentality” and became able to present itself as a responsible and professionally led party being able to present concrete solutions to the most pressing problems in the society. SLD could benefit from the mistakes by the right wing parties, e.g. the bad governance in case of the introduction and implementation of the four “big reforms” in the late 1990s. Gradually the political profile became more professional, technocratic and pragmatic. SLD emphasized reform, secular identity, pro-Europeanism, and mitigation of the worst social costs of transition. More and more SLD behaved as a catch-all party, appealing to broad sections of the Polish population. Most Poles seemed to be “transformation-tired” and did not show great interest in the introduction of new “big reforms”. Also the support from the trade union OPZZ and those engaged in the new private sector played an important role. The evaluations remained asymmetric as other parties still did not recognize SLD as a “standard political party”.

Most important for the new “post-communist” government was to bring to the majority of the Polish people more realistic expectations concerning future welfare, secure Poland a place in the EU and raise the quality of the law making and implementation process, i.e. the public governance as a whole. After taking over governmental responsibilities several new problems emerged on the policy level.

The results of the regional and local elections in November 2002 were not promising, especially not in the big towns. Just after the elections there has even been talk about an AWS-scenario for SLD. The membership of the EU has been a strategic goal, a valens issue of all mainstream Polish parties, and that did not change after changes of government. The entrance into parliament of two populist parties, the Self Defence (“Samoobrona”) and the Catholic League of Polish Families made an impact. Nevertheless, the EU negotiating strategy of the SLD-UP government became “softer” compared with the policy of the AWS led government and at the same time more realistic. At the same time the EU negotiations raised some disagreements in the government, especially concerning negotiation chapters related to agriculture. In the end, the result of the EU Copenhagen summit in December 2002 was accepted by the EU-positive parties in Sejm, including a majority of the PSL. However, the relations to the EU and Germany and France worsened at the beginning of 2003 because of the Polish governments demands about re-negotiation of some sections in the agreement with the EU reached at the Copenhagen summit and, not least, the Polish governments and president Aleksander Kwasniewskis unconditional support to the US line concerning war against Iraq.

In March 2003 the peasants party (PSL) was excluded from the government due to lack of party discipline, e.g. at voting in parliament. After defection of PSL from government SLD-UP had to rule in the shape of a minority government until next election which may take place at latest in June 2004, maybe at the same time as the first Polish election to the European Parliament. After the victory at the EU referendum Leszek Miller declared that he would try to govern the country until next ordinary election in 2005.

Several new policy initiatives were introduced from the SLD led government. The new SLD-UP government put forward a programme for economic growth under slogans such as “entrepreneurship”, “development” and “work”. Also some cuts in the budget for 2002 were adopted. The aim of the economic plan was to increase the growth of BNP to 5 pct. in 2004 by state support to new entrepreneurs, especially new educated, more employment due to more growth, infrastructural projects, lower interest on new loans, and better use of the money obtained from the EU-budget. However, the cuts in the state budget 2002, the new rules of support for medicine, the new labour code, changes in programme of social protection, the limitations on work of pensioners and budgetary spending cuts significantly lowered the popular support. Some disagreements, however, emerged inside the government (Kolodko versus Hausner) about the right “Economic medicine”. The final result was the resignation of Kolodko from the post as minister of finance in June 2003. In other words, the programmes of social protection, budgetary spending cuts, and reforms necessary for EU membership appeared to be contradictory and at the same time almost insurmountable

To conclude, working in government, most problems of SLD seemed to be on the policy-level, including several problems concerning “good government” and accusations of corruption and focusing on the “technology of power”, e.g. in case of the “Rywing-affair”, a media scandale, and the “Starachowice” affair, concerning SLD deputy Grzegorz Jagiello, who was accused of blocking the investigation of criminal cases against local SLD-deputies, inevitably also involving the government and thePrime Minister (Leszek Miller). In June 2003, just after the Polish “yes” at the EU referendum, Leszek Miller demanded and obtained a vote of confidence in the parliament, and later, at the second congress of the SLD in July 2003 after some weeks of heavy debate about the ongoing crisis of the party, Leszek Miller was re-elected as chairman of the SLD without any rival candidate, but several deputies took the decision to abstain from voting in protest against the bad governance of the party.

The “little sister” of SLD: The Workers Union (UP)

From the outset the Workers Union (UP) claimed to present the non-communist and social democratic part of the Left and besides that constitute an association of “mixed” origin, with roots in both the old and the new system. UP aimed to present itself as the “clean hands party” without any shares in the old system and the bad side of the new post-communist system. Despite offers from SLD the Workers Union (UP) refused to join the SLD-led government in 1993 based on the argument that the government followed a too liberal economic and social policy. The real explanation, however, seemed to be historic and structural. The leadership of the party wanted to keep the distance to the “post-communists”, maintain the freedom of manoeuvre and appear as an authentic non-communist left party.

The Workers Union (UP) was established back in 1992 by unification of Works Solidarity (LS) and The Democratic Social Movement (DMS). Both groups had the historical background in the Solidarity movement. The initiative to the formation of UP originated from Ryszard Bugaj, an economist, in 1980-81 he had been one of the experts for the Solidarity movement, during the state of emergency in the 1980s Bugaj was in internment camp. Among the other initiators we find Aleksander Malachowski, and also some members of the social liberal faction of Solidarity joined UP.

The Labour Union (UP) appealed to reform minded members of the former communist party (PZPR) and Poland’s Social Democratic Union (SUP). In most cases we are talking about former members of PZPR who in the 1980s had joined the trade union Solidarity (“S”). The UP faction Works Solidarity (LS) was the most dismissive concerning accepting former communists in the party.

Disagreement erupted soon after the establishment of UP as regards future cooperation with the “post-communists”. The first chairman of UP Ryszard Bugaj took a negative position, while the successor on the post Marek Pol took a more favourable position. However, the party never refused to cooperate with SLD informally and because of Marek Pol’s position as the minister of trade and industry in the SLD-PSL government 1993-97 UP was indirectly represented in the first “post-communist” government.

The Works Union (UP), Democratic Union (UD) and the SLD appealed to almost the same social groups. At the 1993 election UP gained 7,3 pct. of the votes and 41 seats in parliament, more than expected. The party received electoral support because of the opposition to the severe abortion laws and the interference of the church in domestic politics. UP mostly appealed to workers and low educated groups, but at the 1993 election obtaining most support from better educated, similar to SLD, UD and liberal KL-D. Surprisingly more farmers than workers voted on the party in 1993 (Knuzewski:153).

At the 1997 election UP lost the representation in parliament. Thus UP did not benefit from the four years in opposition. On policy level, before the election the party tried to gain support by criticizing the privatizations and SLD’s technocratic power-focusing line. According to Bugaj SLD did not express “authentic” left values, thus impeding the creation of a more consistent, future-orientated authentic left policy.

The election result was better for UP at the 1998 elections to regions and municipalities. Before those elections UP and PSL formed an election alliance (“Przymierze Spoleczne”). However, that cooperation became most beneficial for the much better organised PSL. At the beginning of 1998 some from Bugajs faction left UP and joined the Freedom Union (UW), though first without formally leaving UP. Before the 1997 election the representation of UP in parliament had been reduced to 36 seats, as several former UP members took the decision to join the new political independent association “Nowa Demokracja” (“New Democracy”).

As noticed above a crucial point was the different attitudes to the past, i.e. problems on the structural level. The aim was to appear to the electorate as an authentic left wing party without roots in the old system. That profile, Bugaj argued, might be lost by joining a SLD led government. In December 1998 eight members from Bugajs group left the party using the argument that the election alliance “Przymierze Spoleczne”, e.g. in case of the appointments to leading positions that took place after the regional and local elections in October 1998. Those appointments to a too large extent supported the “post-communists”. The leadership of UP refused all accusations about being an “appendage” to the much better organized peasant party (PSL). However, that PSL profited most from the cooperation could not be denied[15]. Bugajs relationship to UP became so bad that he was not even invited as a guest at the UP congress in February 2000. At that congress several guests from other groups on the Polish Left were invited. Furthermore the leaders of UP supported the president (Kwasniewski) at the forthcoming presidential election and thus, it was argued, reinforced the old divide of the political scene in Poland in a “post-Solidarity” group and a “post-communist” group.

As regards attitudes to the time before 1989 the Works Union (UP) took a centristic position. On the one side the radical anticommunism on the Right was rejected, on the other side the party tried to move the society as long as possible away from the old state socialist system. Ryszard Bugaj argued that those who wanted de-communisation (“dekomunizacja”), had to a much greater extent than until now to prove that the new system they aimed to build up was in accordance with the aims of the majority of the Polish people and thus helping the further consolidation of the new won democracy.

After his defection from UP Bugaj formed his own polical club in the Sejm[16]. Bugaj spoke about the need of a new Left, a “third way” without close cooperation with the “post-communists”, arguing that Poland was in need of a new authentic left party able to appeal to those voters that did not support SLD. According to Bugaj UPs cooperation with SLD gave space for a “fourth element” in Polish politics outside the three others, AWS, SLD and UP-PSL. Bugajs group mostly consisted of intellectuals in opposition to “post-communists”. The problem was that a more “dismissive” policy line against SLD inevitably would mean closer cooperation with the right-traditionalist AWS and the right-liberal Freedom Union (UW). Later Bugaj took the decision to join the peasant party PSL expressing euro-sceptical views regarding e.g. the negotiations with the EU and the future of EU integration.

Aleksander Malachowski, one of the founders of the Workers Union (UP), did not share Bugajs rejection of cooperation with the “post-communists”. The majority in UP accepted the close cooperation with SLD and PSL, clearly manifested through the behaviour of most party members at the 1998 local election and in the support to the proposal about a Left “round table”. Marek Pol, UPs leader in 1999, expressed the opinion that the Polish Left needed one single block supporting a common election programme free from the “baggage of the past” and in the front in the fight against political swing to the right and catholic fundamentalism[17]. Therefore UP did not refuse election cooperation with SLD with the aim to secure UP the best as possible representation in the parliament at the 2001 election. An election agreement between UP and SLD was established in October 2000.

As regards the cooperation with SLD the party was in a dilemma. An electoral alliance with SLD may secure the party some seats in parliament, but the price was dependence on Leszek Miller and SLD. After all, the close cooperation with SLD was a question about survival. According to opinion polls at a new election UP may again not pass the treshold requirements for parliamentary representation when going alone. Another dilemma was the right choice of strategy leading up to the presidential election year 2000. The party was not able to represent its own presidential candidate, taking part in presidential election would also be too expensive for the party. On the other hand it was not easy to support SLDs Aleksander Kwasniewski unconditionally. The party leadership felt not able to take the final decision, and therefore took the decision to let the party members take the final decision through a party referendum, that gave Kwasniewski a clear majority.

In conclusion, most problems inside UP mostly have been found on structural level, in different opinions among leaders and party members about the significance of the past for the future and cooperation with the SLD, and to a minor extent than in SLD on the policy level. For the time being, nothing indicates that the Works Union (UP) will gain representation in the next parliament by “going alone”.

Figure : Types of cooperation and alliances among parties in the CEES

Types of cooperation/alliances	Characteristics	Examples
Transitory governments	Normally formed just after the demise of the old system and until the first free election, often set up according to a compromise between representatives from the old and new system, i.e. the opposition	The first non-communist government in Poland, the government in Czechoslovakia after the velvet revolution until the first free election May-June 1990
Negative party alliances	Cooperation between parties primarily based on a common enemy, i.e. the (post)communists and in spite of disagreements on both policy and actor level	Election Alliance AWS and the AWS-UW government in Poland, the SDK-led government in Slovakia after the 1998 election, Democratic Convention in Bulgaria, and (partly) the 4K in the Czech Republic
Tactical alliances	Party cooperation with the primary aim to secure the parties involved a better representation in parliament by minimizing the waste of votes at elections	The first stage of the four party cooperation (4K) in the Czech Republic, “Przymierze Polski” in Poland at the municipal and regional elections in 1998.
Cartel agreements	Power sharing agreements, in which case the policy-content is neglected, the aim is to keep other parties out, the majority principle, “the winners take it all”	The agreements between ODS and CSSD in the Czech Republic after the 1998 election, especially the first “opposition agreement” just after the 1998 election
Imposed agreements	Cooperation between parties established after heavy pressure from the international society, i.e. the West, e.g. the EU	Difficult to find in the “pure” form, however the government established after the 1998 and the 2002 election in Slovakia can be taken as examples.
Free “self chosen” alliances	Several coalition alternatives exist, only few historical structural obstacles and no pressure from the international society. Agreement on policy level is the most important, old cleavages which may be barriers for coalition building are de-freezed or non-existing	The governmental coalition established after the 1998 in Hungary between FIDESZ and agrarian party FKGP. FIDESZ could have established a broad coalition with e.g. the Socialist Party (MSZP). After the 2002 Czech election CSSD could have continued cooperation with ODS, but took the Coalition (K) as partner in government
Historical compromise	Cooperation overcoming deep historical, i.e. structural cleavages. Reflect de-freezing of old e.g. “We versus Them” cleavages	The governmental coalition between the Socialist Party (MSZP) and the liberal Alliance (SZDSZ) after the 1994 election in Hungary

SELECTED LITTERATURE:

-mostly on Central Europe

Ágh, Attila, ”The Paradoxes of Transition: The External and Internal Overload of the Transition Process”, The Journal of Communist and Transition Politics, Vol. 10, no.3, September 1994.

Ágh, Attila (1998), The Politics of Central Europe, London, Thousand Oakes, New Delhi:SAGE Publications.

Antohi, Sorin, Vladimir Tismaneanu (eds.) (1999), Between Past and Future, The Revolutions of 1989 and Their Aftermath, Budapest:CEU Press.

Ash, Thimoty Garton, ”Refolution in Hungary and Poland”, The New York Review of Books, 17 August, 1989.

Augustinos, Gerasomos (1996) The National Idea in Eastern Europe, The Politics and Society, Second Edition, London and New York:Routledge.

Bächer, Roman, Antoni Dudek, Zdislaw Krasnodebski, Jacek Kurczewski, Marek Latoszek, Jerzy Mikulowski Pomorski, Mariusz Muskat, “Solidarnosc dwadziescia lat pózniej”, Kraków:Arkana Historii, 2001.

Balcerowicz, Leszek, "Understanding Postcommunist Transitions", Journal of Democracy, vol.5, no.4, October 1994.

Barany, Zoltan, "The Return of the Left in East-Central Europe", Problems of Post-Communism, January/February 1995.

Barlett, David L., ”Democracy, Institutional Change and Stabilisation Policy in Hungary”, europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 48, no.1, 1996.

Baylis, Thomas A., "Plus a Change? Transformation and Continuity Among East European Elites", Communist and Postcommunist Studies, 1994 (27)(3) 315-328.

Bernhard, Michael, "Civil Society and Democratizatic Transition in East Central Europe", Political Science Quarterly, vol. 108, no.2, 1993.

Bielasiak, Jacek, "Substance and Process in the Development of Party Systems in East Central Europe", Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol.30, no.1, 1997.

Bozóki, András, "The Ideology of Modernization and the Policy of Materialism", Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol.13, no.3, September 1997.

Bozóki, András (ed.) (1999), Intellectuals and Politics in Central Europe, Budapest:CEU Press.

Bozóki, András, "The Legacy of Dictatorship and the Political Change in East-Central Europe", Comparative Social Research, Vol. 14, 1994, pp. 131-155.

Bryant, G.A., Edmund Mokrzycki (eds.) (1997), Democracy, Civil Society and Pluralism (1997), Warszawa:IFIS Publishers.

Bryant, G.A., Edmund Mokrzycki (eds.) (1994), The New Great Transformation?, London and New York:Routledge.

Cahalen, Deborah J., "A Place to stand: Social Movements and Civil Society in Poland", Polish Sociological Review, 3 (107), 1994.

Connor, Walter D., Piotr Ploszajski (eds.) (1992), Escape from Socialism, The Polish Route, Warsaw:IfiS Publishers

Cook, Linda J., Mitchell A. Orenstein, Marilyn Rueschemeyer (1999), Left Parties and social Policy in Postcommunist Europe, UK and US:Westview Press.

Dahl, Robert (1971), Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Derleth, J. William, The Transition in Central and Eastern European Politics (2000), Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, New Jersey 07458.

Diamond, Larry (1999), Developing Democracy toward consolidation, Baltimore and London:The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Downs, Anthony (1957), An Economic Theory of Democracy, New York:Harper and Row

Dudek, Antoni (2002), Pierwsze lata III Rzeczypospolitej 1989-2001, Krakow:Arkania, Poland.

Dziewanowski, M. K. (1976), The Communist Party of Poland, An Outline of History, Second Edition, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England: Havard University Press.

Grabowski, Miroslaw, ”Political Parties: Social Representative or Agent of Change?”, Polish Sociological Review, 4 (116), 1996.

Higley, John and Michael G. Burton, "Types of Political Elites in Postcommunist Eastern Europe", International Politics, 34: 153-168 (June 1997).

Holc, Janine P., "Liberalism and the Construction of the Democratic Subject in Postcommunism: The Case of Poland", Slavic Review", no.3(Fall 1997).

Holmes, Leslie (1997), Post-Communism, A Introduction, Polity Press.

Holmes, Leslie T. and Wojciech Roszkowski (eds.) (1997), Changing Rules, Polish Political and Economic Transformation in Comparative Perspective, Warsaw:Institute of Political Studies, Polish Academy of Sciences.

Huntington, Samuel (1991), The Third Wave: Democratization on the Late Twentieth Century Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.

Illner, Martin, ”Post-Communist Transformation Revisited”, Czech Sociological Review, Vol. 4, no. 2, Fall 1996.

Inglehart, R. (1990), Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Societies, Princeton:Princeton University Press.

Inglehart, R. (1977), The Silent Revolution Changing Values and Political Styles, Princeton:Princeton University Press.

Innes, Abby, “Party Competition in Postcommunist Europe, The Great Lottery”, Comparative Politics, October 2002.

Inotai, András, ”Europe: Challenges and Risks at te Turn of the Century- An Economic Approach from Central Europe”, Perspectives, Institute of International Relations, no. 6-7, 1996.

Ishiayama, Johan and András Bozóki, “Adaption and Change: Characterizing the Survival strategies of Communist Sucessor Parties”, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol. 17, No.3, September 2001:32-51.

Katz, Richard S. and Peter Mair, "Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy, the Emergence of Cartel Party", Party Politics, Vol.1, No.1, 1995.

Katz, Richard S., Oeter Mair, ”Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party”, Party Politics, 1, 1, 1995.

Kirchheimer, O. (1966), ”The Transformation of the Western European Party Systems”, in J. la Palombara and M. Weiner (eds.) Political Parties and Political Development, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Kitschelt, Herbert, ”The Formation of Party Systems in East Central Europe”, Politics and Society, 20, 1, March 1992.

Kitschelt, Herbert, ”Formation of Party-Cleavages in Post-Communist Democracies”, Party Politics, Vol. 1, no.4, 1995.

Kitschelt, H., Z. Mansfeld, R. Markowski, G. Toka (1999), Post-Comunist Party Systems: Competition, Representation and Inter-Party Cooperation, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.

Knyzewski, Krzysztof (1998), Partie i System Partyjny w Polsce w Okresie Transformacji Ustrojowej, Warszawa:Wydawnictwo Naukowe.

Kofman, Jan, Wojciech Roszkowski (1999), Transformacja i Postkomunizm, PAN ISP, Warszawa.

Kolarski-Bobínski, Lena (red.) (1999), Druga Fala Polskich Reform, Warszawa:Institut Spraw Publicznych.

Kopecký, Petr, "Developing Party Organizations in East-Central Europe, What type of Party is likely to Emerge?", Party Politics, Vol.1, No.4, 1995.

Korbonski., Andrzej, ”The Politics of Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe”, Soviet Studies, Vol. XLI, No.1, January 1989, pp.1-19.

Kotz, David with Fred Weir (1997), Revolution from Above, The Demise of the Soviet System, London and New York:Routledge.

Lewis, Paul G. (1994)., Central Europe since 1945, Longman:London and New York.

Lewis, Paul G., "Civil Society and the Development of Political Parties in East-Central Europe", Journal of Communist Studies, Vol.9, December 1993, London.

Lewis, Paul G. (2001), Party Development and Democratic Change in Post-Communist Europe, The First Decade, London. Portland, OR:Frank Cass Publishers.

Lewis, Paul G., "Theories of Democratization and Patterns of Regime Change in Eastern Europe", Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol.13, No.1, March 1997.

Lewis, Paul G., “The “Third Wave” of Democracy in Eastern Europe, Comparative Perspectives on Party Roles and Political Development”, Party Politics, vol.7, No.5, 2001, pp. 543-565.

Lewis, Paul G. and Radzislawa Gortat, "Models of Party Development and Questions of State Dependence in Poland", Party Politics, Vol.1, no. 4, 1995.

Linz, Juan L., And Alfred Stepan (1996), Problems of Democratic Transformation and Consolidation- Southern Europe, South America, Post-Communist Europe, Baltimore:The John Hopkins Press.

Lipset, Seymour Martin and Stein Rokkan (1967), Party Systems and Voter Alignments. Cross-National Perspectives, New York:Free Press.

Mahr, Alison and John Nagle, "Resurrection of the Successor Parties and Democratization in East-Central Europe", Communist and Post-Communist Studies, vol.28, no.4, 1994.

Markowski, Radoslaw, ”Political Parties and Ideological Spaces in East Central Europe”, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 30, no.3, 1997.

Markowski, Radoslaw (red.) (1999), Wybory Parlamentarne 1997, System Partyjny, Podstawy Polityczne, Zachowanie Wyborcze, Warszawa:PAN ISP.

Markwick, Roger D. "A Discipline in Transition?: From Sovietology to "Transitology", Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol.12, No.3, September 1996.

Matynia, Elzbieta (ed.) (1996), Grappling with Democracy, Deliberations on Post-Communist Societies (1990-1995), Prague:Sociologické Nakladelstvi, Prague.

Millard, Frances (1999), Polish Politics and Society, London and New York.Routledge.

Mokrzycki, Edmund, "From Proto-Capitalism to Post-Socialism: The Macro-Structural Dimension of two Changes of Political System in Poland", Polish Sociological Review, 3(119), 1997.

Morawski, Witold (1998), Zmiana Institucjonalna, Warszawa:Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN.

Palecki, Krzystof, Elity Polityczne w Polsce (Wydawnictwo pokonferencyjne Kazimierz Dolkny 19-21 listopada 1992), Zarzad Glowny Polskie Towarzystwo Nauk Politycznych, Warszawa 1992.

Podgorecki, Adam, "The Communist and Post-Communist Nomenklatura", Polish Sociological Review, 2(106), 1994.

Politicus, journal published by ”Institut Studiów Politycznych PAN”, Warszawa.

Pridham, Geoffrey (ed.) (1995), Transitions to Democracy, Comparative Perspectives from Southern Europe, Latin America and Eastern Europe, Dartmoth, Aldershot, Brookfield, Singapore, Sydney.

Pridham, Geoffrey and Paul Lewis (eds.) (1996), Stabilizing fragile democracies (1996), London and New York: Routledge.

Pridham, Geoffrey and Tatu Vanhanen (eds.) (1994), Democratization in Eastern Europe, London: Routledge.

Przeworski, Adam, Susan C. Stokes, Bernard Manin (eds.) (1999), Democracy, Accountability, and Representation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ramet, S. (ed.) (1998), Eastern Europe Politics, Culture and Society Since 1939, Indiana University Press.

Jacques Rupnik, "The Post-Totalitarian Blues", Journal of Democracy, 1. 1992.

Rychard, Andrzej (1993), Reforms, Adaption and Breakthrough, Warsaw:IfiS Publishers.

Sanford, G. (1999), Poland The Conquest of History, Amsterdam:Harwood Academic Publishers.

Sartori, Giovanni (1976), Parties and party systems, A Framework for Analysis, Cambridge University Press.

Schedler, Andreas, “Taking Uncertainty Seriously: The Blurred Boundaries of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, Democratization, Vol. 8, No. 4, Winter 2001, pp. 1-22.

Schiander, Knut, “Kontraktsdemokrati versus forhandlet revolusjon- hvordan det umulige ble mulig”, Internasjonal Politikk 57 (4) 1999:527-550.

Schmitter, Philippe C., "Dangers and Dilemmas of Democracy", Journal of Democracy, April 1994

Sisyphus, Social Studies, IfiS Publishers, Volume 1 (IX) 1993

Slodkowska, Inka (ed.) (1995), Programy Partii i Ugrupowan Parlamentarnych 1989-1991, Czesc 1, Warszawa:Institut Studiów Politycznych Polskiej Akademii Nauk.

Schöpflin George (2000), Nations, Identity Power, London:Hurst&Company.

Schöpflin, Georg (1993), Politics in Eastern Europe, 1945-1992, Oxford:Blackwell.

Soika, Jacek (1994), ”Transition to Democracy, the Challenge of the Unexpected”, i ”Cultural Dilemmas of Post-Communist Societies, Warsaw:IfiS Publishers.

Staniszkis, Jadwiga (1991), The Dynamics of the Breakthrough in Eastern Europe: The Polish Experience, Berkely:University of California Press.

Steves, F, “Poland and the institutional system: external influences on democratic consolidation”, Communist and Post-communist Studies 34(2001):339-352.

Szczerbiak, Aleks, “Party Structure and Organizational Development in Post-Communist Poland”, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol. 17, No.2, June 2001, pp. 94-130.

Szklarski, Bohdan (1997), Semi-Public Deomocracy, Articulation of Interests and Systemic Transformation, Warsaw:Institute of Political Studies, Polish Academy of Science.

Sztompka, Piotr, ”Looking Back, The Year 1989 as a Cultural and Civilizational Break”, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 29, no.2, 1996 pp. 115-129.

Sztompka, Piotr, ”Understanding Postcommunist Transition”, Journal of Democracy, vol. 5, no.4, 1994.

Ware, Alan (1996), Political Parties and Party Systems, Oxford:Oxford University Press.

Weselowski, Wlodzimierz, ”Political Actors and Democracy: Poland 1990-1997", Polish Sociological Review, 3(119), 1997.

White, Gordon, "Civic Society, Democratization and Development(I): Clearing the Analytical Ground", Democratization, vol.1, no.3, Autumn 1994.

Wojtaszczyk, Konstanty Adam (19989, Partie w Panstwie Demokratycznym, Warszawa:Wydawnictwa Szkolne i Pedagogiczne.

Zielonka, Jan (ed.) (2001), Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe, Volume I and II, Oxford:Oxford University Press.

Zubek, Voytek: "The Reassertion of the Left in Post-Communist Poland", Europe-Asia Studies, Vol.46, no.5, 1994 (801-837).

---

[1] Underlined by e.g. Edmund Mokrzycki in an interview in Rzeczpospolita 25 February 2000, ”Oczu zamydlic sie juuz nie da”, and confirmed in an interview with me (SR), Warsaw October 1999.

[2] Radoslaw Markowski, Gabor Toka, ”Left Turn in Poland and Hungary. Five Years After the Collapse of Communism”, Sisyphus, 1 (IX), 1993:85-86.

[3] Lena Kolarska-Bobinska, ”Kapitalizm nie taki, jaki mial byc”, Gazeta Wyborcza 6.-7.11., 1999, ”Swiateczna”:2.

[4] Rzeczpospolita 20.9., 1993:6.

[5] Interview with Miller in Rzeczpospolita 19 April, 1999, ”Lewica powinna miec jedna liste”.

[6] Rzeczpospolita, 2 April.

[7] Anna Bogusz, Dorota Mecieja, Zofia Wojtkowska, ”Falszywa lewica”, Wprost, 18 May, 1999:22-23.

[8] Polityka, no. 40 (2213), 2 October, 1999:30-31.

[9] Put forward e.g. by Cimoszewicz in Polityka no.40 (2213) 2 October, 1999:30-31.

[10] Rzeczpospolita 23 August, 1999:A2 and Wojciech Pielecki, ”Trup niezgody”, Gazeta Wyborcza, 15 November, 1999 and my own interview with SLDs Tadeusz Iwinski, Warsaw 20 October 1999.

[11] “The Working Peoples Movement”.

[12] Mentioned e.g. in Dominika Wielowieyska, ”Przez morze czerwone”, Gazeta Wyborcza, 9.3., 1999:16-17.

[13] About those plans, se also Eliza Olczyk, ”Socialdemokratyczna wydmuszka”, Rzeczpospolita 27.-28 March, 1999:3.

[14] Mariusz Janicki, ”Wylacznosc na lewice”, Polityka, no. 16 (2189), 17 April, 1999:26-28.

[15] The struggle inside UP after the 1998 local elections is analysed e.g. in Gazeta Wyborcza 15.12. 1998 (“Partia Bugaja bez Bugaja”).

[16] “Stowarzyszenie Studiów i Inicjiatyw Spolecznych”.

[17] Eliza Olczyk, „Socjaldemokratyczna wydmuszka“, Rzeczpospolita 27-28 March, 1999:3.