8 August 2003

Civic Democratic Party

- from Civic Forum to Civic Democratic Party

Søren Riishøj, senior lecturer at the Institute of Political Science, University of South Denmark email: sr@sam.sdu.dk

This article attempts to shed light on the transformation of the political landscape in the Czech Republic after the velvet revolution November-December 1989 with special focus on the emergence of the Civic Forum and the two liberal successor parties Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA) and especially Civic Democratic Party (ODS). Compared with Civic Democratic Party (ODS) Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA) constituted a loosely organized cadre party. From the outset the ODS party leader Vaclav Klaus had a clear liberal political vision, underlining the importance of the transition from plan to market and establishment of a functional federation. The aim was to establish a well institutionalised “standard” party. Soon the euro-critical policy line became striking.

Compared with president Havel Vaclav Klaus presented himself as a distinct “party man”. Vaclav Klaus’ strategy seemed to succeed at least until the mid 1990s. The structural factor and, the harsh bureaucratic centralistic system before 1989 made liberalism almost a “liberation discourse” for many, especially the well-educated. From that time the belief in the “economic miracle” and the “crisis free” transition from plan to market, proclaimed by ODS was clearly waning. The problems were increasing on all levels, the structural level, i.e. the significance of the communist past, institutional level, e.g. the centralisation of decision-making, policy-programme level, e.g. the too great weight on economic issues, and actor level, e.g. “wars on the top” between Vaclav Klaus and “all others”.

The problems increased after the defeat at the 2002 parliamentary election. Nonetheless, at the November 2002 Senate and local election ODS, only four months after the defeat at the parliamentary election, ODS came out as the winner, mainly caused by the fact that Vaclav Klaus’ mark had been almost invisible in the election campaign and that Klaus before the election had proclaimed that he no longer wanted to lead his party.

The “forerunner”: The Civic Forum (CF)

Civic Forum (OF) appeared on the political scene in the late 1989 as a spontaneously established movement type elite-driven catch-all party alliance based on a distinct anti-communist ideology. As in other post-communist countries OF can not be clearly placed on a left-right scale as described by Diverge, Stein, Rokkan and Sartori. At almost the same time as Civic Forum (OF) in the Czech Republic, and in Slovakia The Movement against Violence (VPN) emerged in the shape of a “pragmatic coalition” consisting of former dissidents, ecologists, artists and- until February 1990- the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH). Also many reform-minded members of the Communist Party (KSC) joined VPN including known personalities such as Marian Calf, Alexander Dubcek and Milan Cic, according to opinion polls at that time they were the most popular Slovak politicians. At that time the social links between parties and voters were almost absent. In addition, the representation of neo-liberals was lower in The Movement against Violence (VNP) than in the Civic Forum (OF).

Like in the case of other anti-communist movement parties in the Cheeks the political activities of most opposition parties had focused on “beating” the old system, less on how to construct of the new post-communist system after the victory over the communists had been won. Thus the “We-Them” distinction was striking from the beginning. “Them” not only included “old” communists, but for many people on the Right also reform minded ex-communists and “third way” thinking people. The political style was “all embracing” and therefore catch-all. Party alliances have mostly been “negative”, like in case of Solidarity in Poland opposing the old system and the (post)communists. In addition, at the outset OF could not, like Solidarity, lean on an old “foundation myth” and was like Charta 77 weakly institutionalized. The break with the old system had taken place quickly, over one or two weeks, like in DDR signified by implosion and system collapse.

The vision of Vaclav Klaus, the minister of finance in the transition government, was distinctly conservative-liberal. His demands could be summarised in three points: support for a liberal economic policy, resistance against all type of “socialism”, also the social democratic type, and transformation of Civic Forum (OF) to an institutionalised standard party. Opposite Klaus president Vaclav Havel, remained fixed on the “antipolitical” discourses and social liberal ideology. Thus, in full accordance with that one of Civic Forums (OF) slogans read: “Parties are for party people, Civic Forum (OF) is for all”[1]. The foundation of Civic Forum (OF) was neither collectivistic nor national-patriotic, rather based on the civic principle. The life of OF became short. Before the dissolution, OF had adopted a first liberal anti-communist political programme. In other words, when the neo-liberal line got the upper hand, Civic Forum (OF) became internally divided. In spite of that cooperation in Civic Forum (OF) and government was maintained until the ordinary election in 1992.

The “return to Europe” was the ultimate political goal of CF. Opposite Solidarity in Poland, from the beginning CF focused mostly on economic questions and showed a considerable political moderation. Subjects such as social justice, democracy, confiscation of communist property and reconstruction of the federation had the first priority. However, after short time the liberal and the traditionalists (“non-politicians”) established their own platforms and thus moved CF in different directions. The former dissidents expressed romanticism and anti-politics, the neo-liberals individualistic, economic and technocratic views. In the first stage of transition anomie and extraordinary politics individuals such as Vaclav Klaus and Vaclav Havel in the Czech Republic played an important role (“political crafting”). The political slogans and discourses were marked by the experiences from the political underground and the suppression under the old system. Before 1989 the dissidents had not been able seriously to challenge the system as the communist party (KSC) had been well organised, and the regime-type centralistic-bureaucratic and frozen post-totalitarian. After the velvet revolution the Prague-Spring and the “socialism with a human face” were pushed aside, constituting a foundation myth for only small political groups on the Left, e.g. “Obroda” (“Rebirth”).

From the start also institutional confusion was striking. On the one side much freedom of manoeuvre was left to the local level, on the other important decision were taken by OF’s leadership (“koordinacni centrum”) without consultations on local level, what the “revolutionary” anomic situation did not allow. Due to the “extraordinary” situation the leaders were “appointed”, not elected by the people. As other anticommunist movement parties also Civic Forum (OF) was established outside the parliament, i.e. in "indogenous" ways without previous democratic elections. As noted above, the party institutionalisation and party culture remained weak, at least compared with post-communist successor parties, e.g. the communist party (KSCM) and the Christian-Democratic KDU-CSL.

After the successful election in May-June 1990 OF was divided in several political platforms, but already in October 1990 Vaclav Klaus argued in favour of an ideological and organisational “streamlining”. The election of Klaus as the first chairman of Civic Forum (OF) took place only three days after some members of the OF parliamentary club had formed the platform “The Club of Democratic Right”. The views concerning the future institutional structure remained deviating. Thus the then foreign minister Jiri Dienstbier argued that OF should remain a broadly based movement party, an umbrella for different political groups, but the movement line did not obtain the sufficient support at the January 1991 congress in Prague. At that congress Vaclav Klaus was re-elected as chairman.

At the Prague congress the decision was taken to transform Civic Forum (OF) into a “standard” political party. Also a new party programme was adopted, a new 17 man executive board was elected and only individual membership accepted. All members had to be registrated and all members needed a membership card Furthermore, they had to pay party fee, follow the party statutes and support the new party programme. The new programme did not deviate substantially from the previous one, but nonetheless introduced something new. Thus all types of “collectivistic utopia” and “false social demagogy” were rejected, including the social democratic welfare state ideology. Former members of the people's militsia and StB collaborators were denied access to the new party. Thus after the Prague congress Civic Forum (OF) could be considered as a political party in the minimalist sense, no longer trying to include as many different political factions and platforms as possible.

The disagreements inside CF speeded up after the Prague congress. Klaus’ liberal ideology and arrogance were criticized from many sides. Two political groups, KAN (“The Club of non-party engaged”) and The Movement for Civic Freedoms left Civic Forum (OF) because of too strong support for Klaus. The election of Klaus as chairman of CF was neither the choice of the Liberal Club. From that side the course of the congress was considered as undemocratic and intolerant reluctant to listen to others opinions. Furthermore, from liberal side also important sections in the new political program and the organisation of the party were rejected, nevertheless for the time being the liberal faction remained inside the OF in order to ensure political stability. The formal division of Civic Forum (OF) took place in February 1991, i.e. some time after the first free election. In the following I will focus on the two most important “successor-parities”, the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) and the Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA),

Civic Democratic Party (ODS): the first stage

The other liberal party, the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) was established in March-April after the split inside Civic Forum (OF). The founding congress took place 21-22 April 1991 in Olomouc, at which occasion also a preliminary political program was adopted[2]. The first ordinary congress took place November 1991 in Plzen. ODS did not remind us of most other new non-communist parties. From the outset local, regional and republican party branches were well established. In the mid 1990s ODS had about 22.000 party members organised in 1391 local branches, i.e. relatively high membership base that only post-communist parties such as KSCM and KDU-CLS could match[3]. The aim of Vaclav Klaus was to form a well organized centre-right programme party with a clear political profile and a strong organisation.

Klaus argued that the Czech Republic needed a concrete ideal, a new vision and discourse for the return to Europe. In the longer run, he argued, a right wing party with broad voter appeal could not remain based on the civic principle. On policy level the main emphasis was laid on the economy. Opposite president Havel Vaclav Klaus was a “party man” and “man of finance”. In the first half of the 1990’s Klaus’ neoliberalism almost became the dominating discourse. Jiri Dienstbier’s Civic Movement (OH), the later Free Democrats (SD) and the Social Democrats (CSSD) was accused of “nostalgia” and illusions about going “third ways” between capitalism and socialism inspired by former dissidents theses about anti-politics and the Prague Spring and “socialism with a human face”. Opposite Klaus president Vaclav Havel maintained the old scepticism regarding the role of political parties in society and the links between parties and state power. According to Havels “antipolitical line” the political parties inevitably were centralistically and vertically organised, mostly focusing on “power technology” because of the centralised and undemocratic decision making procedures. Only horisontal institutional structures could generate party democracy, tolerance and close relations to civil society. As a president Havel wanted to be a “spokesman” (“trybuna”) of the “people”, i.e. civil society and he liked to present himself as a non-party man (“nestranik”), i.e. above parties.

Unlike president Vaclav Havel party leader Vaclav Klaus did not believe in anti-politics and the civil society, from the outset emphasizing the significance of political parties for democracy and elite-driven party competition. Several conflicts emerged between Klaus and Havel, in the first years mostly on ideological level. As we shall see, in the late 1990s Havel openly criticised the power-sharing agreement between ODS and the social democrats (CSSD) and he repeatedly made it clear that the ODS-promoted principles on policy-level or institutional and ideological level were not close to him.

Unlike Solidarity in Poland, ODS was not rooted in the dissident movement, as most people in ODS came from the old systems “second rank”, some ministers had been members of the communist party (KSC). Nonetheless, ODS did not like the Freedom Union (UW) in Poland to draw “a thick line” under the communist past. As ODS-members former communist had good opportunities to carve out a good political career for themselves, especially on the local level. The anti-communist rhetoric was strong but not only directed against KSCM, but also against the social democrats (CSSD) who were accused of “crypto-communism” and “nostalgia” going back to the Prague Spring. Due to broad voter support at the 1992 election ODS appeared as a catch-all party. However, in the longer run the party obtained the greatest support among young voters living in the big towns and those belonging to the “transition winners”. The support was particularly great in the capital Prague.

From the outset ODS took a clear position regarding the future of Czechoslovakia. Klaus argued that Slovak politicians were blocking for the implementation of the necessary reform measures, and foreign investors were deterred from investing in Czechoslovakia. Most Western leaders called for the preservation of the federation, but Klaus seemed to reason that Czech stability and economic success would more than compensate for the displeasure from abroad at the dissolution of Czechoslovakia. A stalemate in the Czech-Slovak relationship such as happened at the beginning of the 1990s would have proved a formidable obstacle to the consolidation of the economy and new democracy.

Thus roughly speaking ODS’ programme was characterised by

· neo-liberal politics, liberal democratic principles and party competition

· a centralistic type state administration

· a technocratic, almost management concept of politics

· despect for spontaneous activities in society, i. e. an active civil society

At the beginning ODS was not confronted by much opposition in the parliament. Over the years after 1989 the communists (KSC) had a voter support about 10 pct., at the beginning the social democrats (CSSD) and the liberal centre parties were in an even weaker position. Self-declared centre parties were absent in Czech politics, but Vaclav Klaus denied that Czech politics suffered because of that. According to him the “political middle” was a wrong concept and damaging the consolidation of democracy as political compromises and long negotiations do not lead to the best political solutions. For that reason ODS should neither be a party movement or a centre party.

The party-type

Miroslav Novak did not consider ODS as a cadre party in the classical sense[4]. Since its foundation the party has been run top-down with great power to the chairman and a narrow power circle around him. Tomasz Mackowiak argued that ODS can not be considered as a standard party, but rather as a sect with an idolised leader (Vaclav Klaus)[5]. At that time political factions inside the party was almost non-existing. At the beginning a radical group around the then mayor in Prague Milan Kondor could be observed that wanted to sharpen the purification law (“lustrace”), but that faction became marginalized at the demand of the Vaclav Klaus. Also neo-traditionalism was weakly represented in the party.

At the beginning ODS aimed at the closest possible contact to the voters in order to maximise voter support and obtain governmental power. The strong party competition at the elections enhanced programme- and policy-development. All important policy decisions were still taken top-down. The day to day politics was decided by a narrow group, a network of “close friends” of the chairman. Programmatically ODS constituted a conservative-liberal party underlining individual freedom, private ownership and equal opportunities for all citizens with strong links to what the common European thinking.

In the first years the leadership was transformative and characterized by extensive professionalism. If we exclude the small group KAN, ODS did not have any obvious partners. Thus the coalition potential was rather limited. Christian parties, even the later partners of ODS in government, were regarded as ambiguous as regards attitudes on important policy fields, especially as far as the economic policy. Also the interest of ODS in cooperating in government with the intellectual social-liberal Civic Movement (OH), like ODS a former Civic Form (OF) faction, was modest[6]. Vaclav Klaus and ODS followed their own “third way” for the “return to the West”. Klaus had an eye to Poland where the neoliberal finance minister Leszek Balcerowicz faced big problems trying to convince the electorate about the necessity of the economic shock therapy (“the Balcerowicz-plan I”)[7].

The great voter support only reinforced the development away from the movement line. In an interview in the daily “Lidove Noviny” Klaus described ODS as an electoral party of the “free” type with links going back to Civic Forum (OF) and the broad anti-communist movements[8]. The notion “party” was used intentionally. In the programme “What do we want and what do we not want” Klaus underlined the need of a strong party organisation, i.e. high institutionalisation, a strong membership basis with a party structure anchored in a numerous corps of loyal well trained party functionaries at the local, regional as well as on the central level. The aim was to develop ODS as a programme party of the electoral type, not as a all-embracing catch-all party. What Klaus called a party of “the free electoral type” to some extent reminds us about Duverger's “cadre-parties”, Neumann's “parties with individual representation” and Sartori's “parliament orientated parties”.

Normally political parties consist of different political groupings practicing a peaceful fight against each other. That rule, however, did not work in case of the Czech Republic. Just opposite, the political scene in the Czech Republic has been signified by idealisation of homogeneous parties. By the party leadership almost every deviation from the chosen party line was considered as a “treasury”, as a move against the party interest[9]. The centralisation of power and the top-down decision procedures did not remove the “institutional confusion. Three different decision making centres emerged, one close to the chairman, another centre close to the executive council and a third in the parliamentary group. From the outset the distribution of power between those three power centres have been unclear. Magdalena Hadjisky does not share the opinion that ODS behave like a unitary political entity. Because considerable influence belonged the local “manazers” of the party, media driven campaigns in which case the central office of the party had a strong position, came to play an important role[10].

Thus the characteristics of a movement party soon disappeared. In the long run, considered as a broadly based movement-party OF was an unsustainable construction, unrealistic and even dangerous. For Klaus the crux of the matter was the transition to market economy as quickly as possible, supported by a growing middle class. The notion “market economy” was chosen in stead of “capitalism”.

Some political opponents characterised Klaus thinking about ODS as “bolschevistic”, i.e. as a specific post-communist variant of the leninist doctrine about the leading role of the party, i.e. the party leadership. However, Klaus’ party view conformed relatively well with the prevailing attitudes in the population, as ODS for the majority of the electorate appeared as a relatively well institutionalized party, led by strong personalities and with clear visions and programmes about the future[11].

From the 1992 election success to the 1996 election “stagnation”

At the 1992 election ODS came out as the greatest party and with a broad voter support. At that time the economic prospects seemed to be promising, and the unemployment rate was almost extremely low. One example of Klaus’ tactical abilities was the way he used the voucher privatisation during the election campaign in 1992. Only participation of Czech citizens in the voucher privatisation and the small privatisation was allowed and the “voucher book” promoted as a “gift from mr. Klaus”. The strategy of making the electorate believe in a crisis-free transition from plan to market was a success at least until the mid 1990s. In those years ODS was able to formulate the polical agenda and was kept afloat by the economic mobilisation and the wide-spread belief in an “economic miracle”.

Also the favourable macroeconomic figures spoke in favour of moving gradually ahead. Regardless the neo-liberal rhetoric ODS took a “gradualistic” view as regards the implementation of the economic reform. Pragmatism and policy expediency clashed with shock-therapy and market ideology. Having pushed forward privatisation in the early 1990s, Klaus delayed the introduction of the more unpopular reforms in order to secure the re-election at next election scheduled to take place June 1996[12]. To forestall unemployment the banks were not fully privatised, and rents and energy prices not deregulated.

The combination of “shock” therapy in some areas and gradualist stop-go policy in others produced the specific Czech pathway, an “economic miracle” followed by economic mess. The neoliberal banner was kept high, but the economic medicine remained mild. Therefore we can speak about “pragmatisation without de-ideologisation”. Neither the key macroeconomic figures spoke in favour of taking too many economic policy risks. Unpopular economic proposals were postponed or even cancelled, e.g. laws on price liberalisation, bankruptcy laws and privatisation of strategic important sectors like telecommunication, energy, housing and banking and financial sector as a whole.

Among economists the extreme centralised planned economy before 1989 reinforced pro-market attitudes. For many the principle about free market economy became an ideology of liberation, so the neo-liberal discourse was the dominating, almost the official discourse. Klaus was able to convince the West –and the Czech public- that the political and economic transition had been all but complete. The moral policy aspects such as demands of more strict purification (“lustrace”) and restitution and fight against corruption were given low priority. The need for lustration was scarcely deeply held belief, but he was pressured to endorse the more militant supporters of vetting to retain his right-wing credibility

The election May-June 1996 to a greater extent followed socio-economic cleavages. In 1996 the ODS won 29.6 percent of votes and created a minority government with the centrist Christian Democrats (KDU-CSL) and ODA. At the 1996 election ODS had ceased to be a predominantly catch-all type party. The election became more retrospective and the political capital from the period of extraordinary politics and transition anomie had disappeared. ODS obtained the greatest electoral support from those social groups that had been able to profit from the transition from plan to market. At the 1996 election almost 70 pct. of the private entrepreneurs voted ODS or ODA, and most blue colour workers and low wage income groups social democratic, communist or the extreme Right, i.e. on the Republicans (SPR-RSC). In contrast, most young and well educated people, living in bigger towns, voted ODS.

Thus gradually the parties had strengthened the bonds to the most significant social groups in society, thus enhancing the transition to more “normal politics”. The 1996 election result, however, did not fulfil the original expectations. Focus on economic questions that had been successful for ODS at the 1992 election, seemed almost contra-productive at the 1996 election, at least as regards the support among new voters.

Until 1996 the majoritarian principle about “the winner takes it all”, had been dominating. A cabinet type management style emerged, and almost all important policy decisions were taken in the party headquarters without much parliamentary control. In the longer run the centralisation of power became a problem for ODS as there was only little room for democratic political debates about the most correct policy line. Thus thee risk of corruption and “kammerateri” was growing. In addition, decentralisation and de-politization of state administration was strongly needed, so that the state apparatus no longer was considered as the victorious ODS´ property and ODS appeared as the party as “the party of power”[13]. One result of the strong focus on economic issues was that non-economic issues such as reform of the health sector, the problems concerning the future of the second chamber, the Senate, and the local and regional reform were either neglected or postponed.

The centralisation and “homogenisation” of the party did not remove disagreements about the right policy line. Thus in the mid 1990s the then foreign minister Josef Zieleniec presented a carefully formulated critique of the strong focus of the party on the economic topics and the neoliberal dogma. While Klaus supported a euro-sceptical monetarist approach to EU, Zieleniec’ ideal was the German CDU favouring a social type market economy. Instead, those policy subjects that were most important to the electorate, e.g. questions about law and order, health, education etc. should be upgraded. Too much emphasis had been laid upon “the technology of power”, also the links to the party members and to the civil society had been neglected. Therefore the move of the party to a power and state focusing party of the cartel type should be cancelled. In the end Zieleniec took the decision to leave ODS, arguing that he had not been sufficiently informed about important policy decisions, including state of the party finances. Later he joined the Quad Coalition (4K).

At the 4. Congress in 1994 a long-term as well a short-term party programme were adopted as an integral part of the preparations to the next parliamentary election. The programme showed that ODS was able also to include policy subjects besides the economic programme points. That change could be seen as an acceptance of the critique of too much party “economism”. At the same time opinion polls showed an increasing support to the principles about more state regulation and state intervention. Such demands were put forward by the Social Democrats (CSSD) and showed to be beneficial for CSSD at the parliamentary elections in 1996 and 1998 as well as at the recent 2002 election.

“Sarajevo” and after

To a large extent the conflicts inside ODS were linked to Klaus’ person, the fall in support to the free market economy and the fall in electoral support resulting in bad rating in the opinion polls[14]. The corruption accusations and illegal financial support lead to the fall of Klaus from the post as Prime Minister of the country. At the same time the growing problems in the Czech economy put question marks at the old promises from ODS about an almost crisis free transition from plan to market.

The fall of the government resulted from the accumulation of financial scandals of all major parties in the coalition. The government’s success in muting the theme of corruption in politics had begun to erode in 1996. The final blow to the coalition government and to ODS came on 29 November 1996 when a Czech daily published an article claiming that ODS had a secret bank account in Switzerland. The collapse was precipitated when the KDU-CSL announced that it was pulling out of the coalition and two prominent members of the ODS, Jan Ruml and Ivan Pilip, called on Klaus to resign. Klaus was in Sarajevo for a meeting of the Central European Initiative at that time, and he has therefore referred to the actions of Ruml and Pilip as the “Sarajevo assassination attempt”, or just “Sarajevo”. The crisis in 1997 brought the position of Klaus as Prime Minister in danger, but due to his strong position inside the party nobody else was able to challenge him.

Several people in the party had advised him to leave as both Prime Minister and party leader. In spite of that at the extraordinary congress in December 1997 Klaus was re-elected as chairman despite accusations of corruption and financial irregularities. Before the extraordinary congress Klaus was also strongly criticised by the president. For the first time in his political career Vaclav Klaus had to face a counter-candidate at an ODS-congress. The main challengers were former finance minister Ivan Pilip and former interior minister Jan Ruml. Ruml tried to remove Klaus from the post as chairman, but lost by a great margin.

At the same time as the eruption of the crisis president Havel health situation worsened. It was uncertain whether Havel was able to continue on the post. Nevertheless in February 1998 Havel was re-elected as president, but only with a very small margin and after two voting rounds in parliament. As said, already before that happened Havels relations to Klaus and ODS had been worsening primarily because of Havel's unmasked support for the removal of Klaus from the post as Prime Minister. At that time conspirator theories were widespread among ODS party members and supporters.

The extraordinary congress in December 1997 showed that the members of the party felt indebted to Vaclav Klaus. Nobody else could “save” the party in the highly problematic situation. None of the accusations of corruption, such as those concerning an ODS Swiss bank account was proven or disproved before the June 1998 parliamentary election (Appel, 2002:541). Thus the party culture and orientation of most party members remained bound to the leadership, on the policy level the voucher-privatisation, the liberal economic policy and the policy line leading to the division of Czechoslovakia.

Until 1997/98 the Czech Republic had not experienced a shift of government, i.e. no “two turn over test”, nor on the presidential post. That happened December 1997 on the governmental level, first in case of the transition government lead by “neutral” and broadly respected national bank director Josef Tosovsky. The real shift on governmental posts had to wait for the extraordinary election in June 1998.

The governmental crisis 1996-1997 and the split inside the two ruling parties (ODS and ODA) left behind a political vacuum on the Right. After the December 1997 party congress the “defector” Jan Ruml established his own new centre right party, the Freedom Union (US). Opinion polls conducted in February 1998 gave the new party between 10 and 15 percent in voter support, almost the same figure as given to ODS. Also the social democratic defector Josef Wagner tried to establish a new centre party, and the ODA-defector Ivan Masek proclaimed the creation of a new right wing liberal party.

At that time a greater transformation of the Czech party system seemed approaching. A deep split on the Right looked immanent. The treshold requirements for representation in parliament were relatively high, five percent and even more for election alliances, for that reason the risk of waste of votes was high. Against that gloomy background negotiations about party fusions and electoral alliances among the parties on the Right were started. Nonetheless, several different centre-right party lists came up at the 1998 election, but in the end the majority of the voters voted on the already established parties in spite of the corruption scandals. At the 1998 election the Freedom Union (US) took over ODA’s position in the Czech parliament.

At 1998 election ODS did surprisingly well, gaining 27 pct. of the votes, almost the same figure as at the previous election. Personal animosities and intense infighting among the three centre-right parties prevented the formation of a right wing government in spite of the sufficient number of seats in parliament. Those parties least associated with past corruption scandals fared worse than expected. Thus corruption seemed to remain a non-issue in Czech politics (Appel, 2002:541). ODS secured many votes during the election campaign due to better campaigning and a more consistent and future-directed election programmes than in case of e.g. the Freedom Union (US). Once more the hypothesis was confirmed that still more voters prefer political parties with distinct political programmes and high institutionalisation. The transformation, Klaus argued, could only be successfully completed by well defined and stable party systems consisting of a few well institutionalised standard parties. Only a revised electoral law and a lower number of parties in the parliament could foster more functional and forward looking decision-making procedures in the parliament.

The power-sharing agreements

The satisfactory election result further strengthened Vaclav Klaus position as the “absolute ruler”. People from lower positions in the party were elected to parliament because many of the old politicians had left the party and after that joined the Freedom Union (US). The desire to draw excessive conclusions as regards the party organisation did not increase, just opposite. The newly elected members of parliament did neither have the desire, the abilities or the possibilities to challenge the existing party leadership, even in case of more controversial decisions, e.g. in case of participation in government or the power sharing agreements with the social democrats (CSSD) entered after the inconclusive 1996 and 1998 elections. After the 1998 election the ODS allowed the Social democrats to form a minority government and pledged to tolerate it.

Under the first agreement, the “opposition agreement” ODS agreed not to support a vote of no-confidence in Zeman's minority government in exchange for key posts in parliament and a say on certain policy decisions. The agreements were held up for four years, during which Zeman’s government relied on the protection of Klaus’ ODS. The opposition agreement had a short, but stormy life. Neither of the two parties involved really loved it. Later, at the 2002 election the social democratic leader Vladimir Spidla, unlike former chairman Milos Zeman, wanted to get rid of the pacts with ODS and in stead strike a pact with the Christian Democrats, if necessary with the Coalition (K) as a whole.

The agreements with the social democrats did not in any way disturb the course of the 10. party congress in December 1999 in spite of several demonstrations directed against the power sharing agreements with CSSD and bad opinion polls. At the 1999 congress Vaclav Klaus once more warned against going “third ways” in the economic politics and clearly distanced himself from president Havel's antipolitics. Having in mind the student demonstrations, organized by “Impuls 99” and “dekujme odejdete” (“We thank you, but go”) he asked not to believe in vaguely formulated political proclamations from the different civic movements, non-authentic subjects (“neautentickimi subjecty”) and intellectual clubs without responsible leadership and long-term political programs[15]. The party even got free hands to enter into further negotiations with CSSD. More and more ODS appeared as a power orientated and “de-ideologized” cartel party. Also a better culture of debate in the party was strongly needed. At the 2000 party congress Klaus recognised that ODS had to be more “open to the society”, at the same time underlining the need of more professionalism in the daily work and more party members.

The congress did not bring important news neither on personal nor programme level. Vaclav Klaus was re-elected as chairman by almost unanimous vote, and the controversial agreements with CSSD was not even discussed at the meetings. Only 29 of the 254 delegates voted in favour of breaching the agreements. According to the party leadership a breach with CSSD would only be beneficial to CSSD and move that party closer to Jan Ruml and the Quad Coalition (4K). Furthermore, Klaus had only a modest interest in returning to government before the Czech economy had escaped recession and the new electoral law and some constitutional legislation had been passed. Should ODS profit at the 2002 election, he argued, the agreements had to be implemented before next ordinary election which might result in major changes in composition of the parliament. Thus the aim of Vaclav Klaus was to create the best possible conditions for the establishment of a new ODS led government. According to Klaus ODS would keep the present level of voter support at the next election, as the party of power, i.e. CSSD would loose the election.

By ODS, basically the social democratic minority government was considered as a “suicide government”. After next election the Czech Republic would be back in the situation leading up to the 1996 election with a ODS led centre-right government facing a divided and weak Left opposition in parliament. In the end, the increasing support for KSCM, it was agued, would be beneficial for ODS. At earlier election campaigns ODS had gained several votes making use of anti-communism. Therefore, as noted above, the ODS leadership even got free hands to enter new power sharing agreements with CSSD.

The ODS euro-scepticism

From the outset the attitudes to the EU has been a crucial part of the ODS´policy profile. In Bruxelles people like Vaclav Klaus in the Czech Republic and Leszek Balcerowicz in Poland were considered as a guarantee for political stability and the quickest as possible transition to market economy. In the first years the Klaus governments were successfully projecting a positive image in the West, and at the same time the “ideology” of Czech exeptionalism” at home. The Czech application for EU membership took place later than in case of Poland and Hungary, partly because of the division of Czechoslovakia. As the then Prime Minister Klaus argued that he did not want to apply for membership at a point of time where membership was unrealistic. Nationalist preoccupations he considered as parochial and narrow-minded and only delaying the economic reforms. Nevertheless he argued against further integration and federalization of the EU. Furthermore, the Czech Republic became the first state of the former Soviet bloc to join the OECD. The influence of the West was evident, but the impetus for change came primarily from within the new political class.

The ambiguous relationship between Klaus and EU has been known in many years. As Czech premier, Klaus several times publicly clashed with then Christian Democrat EU commissioner Hans van den Broek, and Klaus’s relations with Verheugen, a social democrat, was not much better. Unlike other big parties in the Czech Republic, the ODS has not been part of any European political faction operating in the EP. None of the big factions in the European Parliament has shown interest in allying with ODS either. Furthermore, the ODS’ “Manifest of Eurorealism”, issued in Spring 2001, which held a door open for the Czech Republic outside the EU, was a cold shower to all promoters of federal Europe and gave rise to a heated debate between “euro-enthusiasts”, “eurorealists” and “euro-sceptics”. At that time, about 2000-2001, the electoral support for EU membership was declining.

At the ODS party congress November 2001 Klaus underlined that there was “no alternative” to the membership of the EU but the Czech Republic should enter the EU on “equal terms[16]. The party supported EU membership for the Czech Republic, nonetheless it has also been very critical of the EU, and therefore Vaclav Klaus has often been seen as Euro-skepctic. During the 2002 election campaign the party called for special guarantees from EU that the so-called Benes decrees will not be challenged after the country joins the EU.

At the 2002 conference of the euro-critic association TEAM, an association consisting of about 40 groups across the whole political spectrum, Jan Zahradil, a deputy chairman of the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) and ODS shadow foreign minister, and one of the candidates for the chairmanship of ODS after Vaclav Klaus, disapproved the deepening of cooperation within the EU and the transfer of more powers from member countries to European institutions. At several occasions Zahradil pointed to an article in the French daily Le Monde according to which the EU enlargement would convert the EU to a simple free trade zone without complementary political structures. It will, he argued, be advantageous for the Czech Republic, a small open economy, to become part of the single EU market and enjoy its advantages, at the same time opposing views of supporters of the federalist Europe idea, who call for further unification of the EU policies[17]. In spring 2003 observers from the ODS, Zahradil included, attempted to strengthen the Eurorealist stream in the European Parliament and inside the mainly pro-federalist European People’s Party (EEP).

Klaus even claimed that Czech independence and Czech neo-liberal project as being under threat from the “socialist internationalism” of the Bruxelles bureaucracy. Several times Klaus expressed the opinion that Europe needed a “radical portion of liberalism and privatisation”. The adoption of the single European currency he considered as “unreasonable”, as there in his opinion was no need to get rid of one’s own interest policy, and one’s own exchange rate. Unfortunately, instead of using the planned EU expansion for a radical elimination of all forms of subsidies and non-market mechanisms, the integration process has been linked with growth of regulations and increasing protectionism[18]. Acting as president Klaus still expressed euro-scepticism. Visiting France in July 2003 he expressed the opinion that the adoption of the euro was “unreasonable”. There was no need, he said, to get rid of one’s own monetary policy, one’s own interest rate policy, and one’s own exchange rate. Furthermore, it was not necessary to adjust inflation rate to countries, which had not lived through half a century of communism. In fact, he argued, the euro was one of the causes of the current very dangerous slowdown of the economic growth all over Europe in summer 2003. He also considered a lack of flexibility of the monetary policy of the European Central Bank a bigger problem of the European Union[19]. The support to the EU membership has been mixed with euro-scepticism and euro-realism. Klaus spoke in favour of rapid membership of the EU, at the same time he being a vocal critic of the integration projects envisioned by the Maastricht treaty process and the common currency.

The ODS first sharply criticised the conditions of the Czech Republic’s entry to the European Union and also criticised the governments insufficient preparedness. Nonetheless, the new chairman, Mirek Topolanek, who was elected in December 2002, has tried to tear off the euro-sceptical label from the Klaus-era, changing the party into a group of real and not just “paper eurorealists”. Opposite Klaus the new chairman gave a resoundingly “yes” to EU membership after the Copenhagen summit in December 2002. Thus, dismantling the planned economy and preparing for membership of the European Union also in the Czech Republic did not tend to provoke consistent left-right competition as to prove valence issues, issues on which (almost) all parties declare the same object (Czech EU-membership) but dispute each others’ competence in achieving the desired policy, e.g. membership on the best possible conditions as regards the economic aspects. Thus it was primarily the conditions of membership, that were obtained by the social democratic led government at the EU-summit in Copenhagen in mid-December 2002 that were criticised by ODS.

The 2002 election and after

Just after the entering the agreements with CSSD the prospects for next parliamentary election seemed gloomy. The unexpected defeat at the supplementary election to the Senate in an electoral district in Prague September 1999 led to a new debate about the right party line. Miroslav Macek recognised problems as regards the so-called “a dangerous narrowing of the transformation”[20]. Important policy fields had been too much neglected and too small weight at been given subjects such as law and order, better governance and other subjects that exercised peoples mind. Ten years after the velvet revolution a new “Klaus plan II or III” was needed with greater focus on non-economic subjects. According to Miroslav Macek the party should aim to speed up the privatisation process, especially in the financial sector, also administrative reforms and changes on the social- and health area were necessary. In many fields the party program was well developed, Macek stated, but a better implementation and, most of all, better communication with the electorate was needed. At first glance the critique reminded us about Zieleniec’ remarks two years back. Thus different lines existed inside the party, and an agreement about the right policy strategy was difficult to see. The confrontations with the intellectual groups and the president basically repeated itself at new year 2000-2001 in case of strikes among the journalists working at the Czech state TV (CT). Vaclav Klaus even compared the journalists strike actions against the CT council chairman with the events leading up to the communist February coup in 1948.

At the party congress November 2001 more emphasis was laid on Czech EU-membership and critique of the social democratic government and other right wing parties was reinforced. Klaus reminded the public about the negative role of the Freedom Union (US) during the coalition negotiations after the 1998 election, and criticised role of the Czech National Bank. The course of ODS’ congress 2001 again made probable that ODS “stands and fall with Vaclav Klaus”. Vice-chairmen of the party, Ivan Langer and Petr Necas, declared that should negotiations with Freedom Union (US) and KDU-CSL fail once more, a new alliance with CSSD could not be excluded also after the 2002 election. That attitude was also expressed under the 2002 election campaign by Vaclav Klaus. At the same time the new CSSD party leader Vladimir Spidla spoke in favour of abandoning the cooperation with ODS.

As the 2002 election showed, the strategy of ODS failed. At the 2002 election the winning CSSD obtained 70 seats, the ODS 58 and the Coalition (K) of KDU-CSL and Freedom Union-DEU 31. Also at the 2002 election ODS focused mostly on economic issues. In this election campaign, ODS advocated a flat income tax rate of 15 percent, pension reform, and reduction in bureaucracy. However, ODS also called for stricter immigration and refugee laws and laws related to law and order.

After the 2002 election defeat Vaclav Klaus offered his resignation as chairman at the party’s next national conference. At the same time a working group should draw up an analysis of the party’s election campaign, in Klaus’ own words a “cool-headed assessment” of the elections and the campaign”. ODS clearly had not able to profit from the power sharing agreements and explain to the voters the reason for entering the agreements. At the same time Klaus criticized Senate deputy chairman Premysl Sobotka who had withdrawn from ODS’ Executive Council over what he called the ODS leadership’s irresolute and embarrassed reaction to “the election flop”[21]. Surely we have not yet reached the end-game of the post-election power struggle inside the ODS, a second “war in the top” of the greatest liberal party in the Czech Republic erupted after the 2002 election and this time with more far reaching consequences for the party and the position of the chairman Vaclav Klaus.

After the election ODS’ executive council set up a special working group for evaluation of the reasons for the election defeat[22]. As appears from the conclusions from the working group, the explanations shall be found primarily on policy and actor level. Referring to the policy-level the report underlined the negative impact of the power-sharing agreements with CSSD, the modest voter appeal of the ODS election slogans and opposite the broad electoral appeal of the CSSD slogan about establishing a “modern social state”, on actor-level the report referred e.g. to the successful substitution of Milos Zeman as chairman of CSSD by Vladimir Spidla and the formation a new leadership team in CSSD.

The fact that ODS did surprising well at the local elections and the Senate election later in November 2002, four months after the parliamentary election, seemingly overcoming the down-turn in electoral support, might be explained primarily on actor-level, by the fact Vaclav Klaus’ mark was almost invisible during the election campaign and that Klaus before the election had proclaimed that he no longer wanted to lead his party and gives a chance to others[23]. Also falling electoral support for the Freedom Union and KDU-CSL, the two main rivals, played a role. In February 2002 Vaclav Klaus succeeded to be elected as new president after the resignation of Vaclav Havel, inaugurating a change in the style as well as three policy of that institution, and at the same time weakening the position of the CSSD led coalition government and not least the then Prime Minister and CSSD chairman Vladimir Spidla. Working in opposition to the CSSD-led government ODS followed a “tough line” even rejecting the governmental proposal about reconstruction and savings on the state budget, and in stead as an alternative to the government proposals proposing a 15 percent flat income tax, a negative tax for the poor and radical slimming of the governmental apparatus, including a transformation of the Senate to a body of unpaid regional representatives[24].

Soon after the November 2002 election the post as party chairman was taken over by Mirek Topolanek. Electing Topolanek ODS seemed to cut itself from Vaclav Klaus, for Topolaneks closest ally in the struggle for the post as chairman was Ivan Langer, Klaus’ arch-enemy inside the ODS. As noted above, soon after his election the new chairman of ODS teared off the label from the rule of Vaclav Klaus as a “confused eurosceptical party”, thus changing it into a group of real, more positive and not just “paper eurorealists”[25]. Furthermore, differences between Topolanek and Klaus surfaced in connection with the Czech position on the war in Iraq. While Klaus openly disagreed with the U.S. attack ODS representatives, faithful to their pro-American orientation, supported the US led attack on Iraq. It is yet soon to predict how the ODS will look like under the new chairman Mirek Topolanek.

As argued by Petr Fischer, old emotional ties of the ODS chairman to the ideological rival Milos Zeman, former chairman of CSSD, would disappear with Topolanek's arrival[26]. And without ODS’ support Milos Zeman was not able be the new president after Vaclav Havel. From the outset Klaus was seeking to fulfil his promise of being the president of all people. Nevertheless, after short time he took the decision to interfere in daily politics, most important in the case of the government proposal about cuts and reconstruction of the state budget, in which case he vetoed the bill on value added tax that would have raised the price of some services, including telephoning, Internet and law consulting. However, anyway several years before ODS had stopped to be a party of all, a catch-all party.

The “little brother” ODA

The Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA), the (little) sister party of ODS, has been considered an example of a loosely institutionalized caucus-based party of the conservative-liberal type. ODA originated from the Democratic Right, a faction inside the Civic Forum (OF). The Democratic Right can be considered as a political “discussion club” supported by a few hundred neo-conservative minded people, at the beginning mostly Christian-Democratic oriented intellectuals. The decision about the formation of ODA was taken by 13 persons and can therefore reasonably be called a “sofa-party”. Seen over the years since 1989 ODA as a maximum had 2.300 party members. Thus, typically for most non-communist parties, ODA was badly institutionalised and deliberately abstaining from building up clear-cut party structures and accepting the role as the “little brother” to the greater and better organized Civic Democratic Party (ODS). At the 1994 local elections ODA only managed to nominate 280 candidates, including election districts that only covered about half of the electorate.

The formation of Vaclav Klaus’ ODS and Jiri Dienstbier's Civic Movement (OH) soon forced the Democratic Right to transform itself into a regular political party. After that ODA appeared as an elitarian club mostly consisting of better educated people and intellectuals. The party had a common ideology –liberalism- but no common history, no common party traditions and low party institutionalisation. ODS primarily was established due to a fear of too much concentration of power in ODS and Klaus’ hands, but the differences on policy- and program-level were few. For polical reasons, until 1998 ODA cooperated with ODS in government and on regional and local level.

Like other new parties in CEECs the Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA) soon became divided in different factions. One faction took a more critical line against the “big brother” the in government (ODS) and Vaclav Klaus, another and stronger faction including the then minister for economy Vladimir Dluhy wanted to maintain the close cooperation with ODS. At the beginning, the existence of different “clubs” or factions did not constitute any big problem. After the 1996 election a great majority of the ODA leadership decided to continue to cooperate with the Civic Democratic Party (ODS).

After the 1996 election ODA tried to obtain a more marked profile and a stronger organisation. Many could hardly understand that the Czech Republic needed two right wing secularised liberal parties of the civic type. According to them, ODA constituted to an unnecessary split of the Right. Nonetheless, some policy differences existed between the two parties. As regards the privatisation policy ODA to a larger extent than ODS aimed at more support for the establishment of new private enterprises and distanced itself from the “big capital” and bank-owned funds. Where ODA laid emphasis on the process leading to liberal market economy, more ODA underlined the end result. Compared with ODS the party laid more emphasis on the civic principle and close relations to the church[27].

As regards the EU policy line ODA from the start took a federalist position, and as far as local and regional reforms are concerned ODA argued in favour of decentralization. In case of negotiations of the future Czech-Slovak federation ODA followed a tough line. Finally, in stronger terms than ODS the party campaigned in favour of tax reductions. In short, the neo-liberal profile and the defence of the minimal state was more striking in the case of ODA, at least as regards the policy that was practised.

From the 1992 to the 1998 election ODA gained 5 to 10 pct. of the votes, at the 1996 election 6 pct, but after the 1998 election it almost disappeared from the policy scene. The explanations were many: internal disagreements, financial problems and scandals, including a wire-tapping case involving the Security Police BIS and, not least, disagreement concerning the right policy line. As other new parties ODA had not been able to obtain the sufficient “immune defence”, a sufficiently strong party organisation and functional party culture in case of internal and external chocks. The party chairman Jan Kalvoda was forced to leave his post, and as new party leader was elected Michael Zantovski, but also he was not able to unify the party due to lack of gifts as party leader. Also the other “strong man” in the government, minister of economy Vladimir Dluhy, was forced to leave the post because of the macro-economic problems. Even the later party leader Jan Skalicki had to resign because of financial irregularities. Later Skalicki and others from ODA joined the Freedom Union (US).

The disagreements between the different factions gradually became outspoken. A fundamentalistic neo-liberal faction led by Ivan Masek and Roman Cesek opposed the official more centre orientated policy line. The “fundamentalists” argued that the party leadership was guilty of treachery against important right wing ideals and accused the leadership of selling out of the key policy issues only focusing on the participation in government. Especially they criticised what they called compliance to the demands from the trade unions, the lack of reforms as regards pensions and insurance, the slow pace of privatisation as energy and banking and the problems of law and order. Furthermore, they criticised the artificial high employment that was kept up by employment projects subsidised by the state. The split in the party became more and more evident. Demands were put forward about the exclusion of Masek and Cesek from the party, what also became the final decision[28]. The two “defectors” tried to establish a new and more fundamentalist liberal party, but without any success.

Before the 1998 election ODA had taken part in Josef Tosovsky's transitory government, gaining the posts as ministers for environment and justice. The participation in the transitory government aimed at postponing new election and secure the time necessary for political come-back. At the 1998 election ODA lost the representation in parliament, but former ODA leaders were elected on the lists of the new party, the Freedom Union (US). Thus the parliamentary representation of ODA was limited to the second chamber, the Senate. ODA also joined the Quad Coalition (4K). However, February 2002 ODA was forced to leave the Coalition (4K) because of the almost indefinite financial problems of the party. Also policy disagreements inside the Quad Coalition (4K) played a role, e.g. disagreement between ODA and KDU-CSL concerning future cooperation with the social democrats (CSSD). After the fusion of the Freedom Union (US) and DEU the Quad Coalition (4K) consisted of just two parties and for that reason changed name to “the Coalition” (K) before the 2002 election.

In conclusion, the low party institutionalisation, the modest party member basis and the ongoing personification of political disagreements in the party speeded up the factionalisation and the disagreements on policy level party. It has been discussed how much emphasis we shall lay on low party institutionalisation explaining the demise of ODA. As we shall see in case of ODS, also too much centralisation and party discipline might lead to crisis and internal factionalisation, but opposite ODA the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) overcame the crisis due to the higher institutionalisation and, more important, the strong leadership and the well organised election campaign, and thus regained votes lost because of the 1997-98 party crisis at the elections May-June 1998.

Concluding remarks

Summarizing, we can say that the two liberal parties in the Czech Republic, ODA and ODS, emerged from factions inside anti-communist movement Civic Forum (OF). While ODA remained a weakly institutionalized party, ODS became a relatively well organized and centrally governed programme and cartel party. The neo-liberal and euro-realistic discourses had a firm hold on the Czech Right and almost constituted the official discourses until the mid 1990s, the attitudes to the communist past were no longer decisive for majority of the electorate. As said, since 1989 right wing traditionalistic parties have only gained a weak electoral position primarily because of the deep industrial culture and the rather weak position of the church in society. On policy level the differences between the two liberal parties were modest. This implied that the differences between them mostly were primarily expressed on the actor level as a “for” or “against” Klaus, clearly manifested in the connection with the internal split in ODS in 1996-98 and the formation of the Quad Coalition (4K).

While ODA disappeared from the political scene due personal disagreements, weak institutionalisation and financial problems, ODS remained a factor in Czech post-communist politics. The reasons for the demise of ODA and the success of the ODS has been institutional and the actor level. On policy level the differences have been modest. The polarisation of Czech politics was to a large extent a question about being for or against Vaclav Klaus and, in the late 1990s about being for or against the power sharing agreements between ODS and CSSD and the Euro-scepticism of ODS.

After the election defeat 2002 the position of Vaclav Klaus became seriously weakened. As we have seen there were some defections and disagreement about the policy line, but despite the serious political crisis in 1997-1998 and the protests against the power sharing agreements, the position of Vaclav Klaus remained unchallenged until the 2002 election. As a consequence of the bad election result Vaclav Klaus resigned from the post as chairman of the party in December 2002, however, later and after several votes in parliament in spring 2003 was elected as the new president after Vaclav Havel.

At the 2002 election ODS suffered an election defeat, in spite of receiving more than 20 pct. of the votes. The set back in electoral support has be explained with references primarily to the policy level, e.g. the power sharing agreements with CSSD and the bad selection of policy-subjects under the election campaign, and the actor level, the more successful campaigning of CSSD and the new leader and leadership-team.

At the 2002 election CSSD had come out as the best institutionalized right wing party and also the most professionally run. Ten years back in time, in the beginning of 1990’s the situation had been totally different. At that time ODS constituted the only highly institutionalised non-postcommunist party in the Czech Republic. The rise and fall in electoral support can to a great extent be explained on the actor level, i.e. the role of the controversial party chairman Vaclav Klaus, who as noted above, after the 2002 election declared that he would not to run for the chairmanship of the party at the next party congress in December 2002, and in March became the new president of the Czech Republic. After that a new stage in the history of the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) has begun.

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[1] ”Strany jsou pro straniky , Obcanske Forum je pro vsechny”, more about that subject in Miroslav Novak, Systemy politickych Stran, Sociologicke Nakladelstvi, Praha 1997:14 and 30-31.

[2] “The Way to Welfare “,“Cesta k prosperite”.

[3] Klara Vlachova and Kreidl, ”Sila mas”, Ekonom, no.30, 1998:58.

[4] Miroslav Novak (1997), Systemy politickych stran, Praha:Sociologicke Nakladelstvi.

[5] Tomasz Mackowiak, ”Dwójka, czyli piatka”, Gazeta Srodkoeuropejska, appendix to Gazeta Wybrocza and Lidove Noviny 3.2. 2000.

[6] The Civic Movement (OH) that kept a movement line, was not represented in the parliament elected in 1992.

[7] Mentioned e.g. in Martin Mrnka, ”ODS na ceste k moci”, Reporter no. 49, 1991:10.

[8] Interview in Lidove Noviny 2.11. 1999:9.

[9] Underlined by e.g. Buhumil Pecinka, ”ODS na krizovate”, Lidove Noviny, 6.9. 1994:5.

[10] Magdalena Hajdjiisky, ”Competing Conceptions of Democracy in the Practice af Politics”, Draft, ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, 14.-19.4. 2000, Copenhagen.

[11] Socialni Trendu, ”Co rikaji volby do Snemovny o ceske politické scéne”, Rocnik I. 1997.

[12] See Milada Anna Vachudová, “The Czech Republic”, inZielonka and Pravda (eds), 2001:336.

[13] That type of critics has been presented by the former spokesman of president Havel, Jiri Pehe, e.g. in te daily Hospodarske Noviny 20.1. 1998:6 (”Cesky demokraticky system postrada nekteré dimenze”).

[14] Described e.g. by Klara Vlachová, ”Je to a pocitech”, Ekonom no. 44, 1997.

[15] Argued by Klaus in several interviews, e.g. in Hospodarske Noviny 21.2. 2000:11, “Dali jme ekonomice cas, aby se vzchopila”.

[16] www.ceskenoviny cz, 3.11. 2001”, “Priority bouduci vady ODS je rovnopavné clenstvi v EU”

[17] Czech Happenings, www.ceskenoviny.cz 11 March 2002 and 8 May 2003, ”EU enlargement will help prevent its further unification-Zahradil” and “Zahradil to strengthen Eurorealitic stream in EP”.

[18] Speaking e.g. to the European Forum in Albach, Austria 27 August 2001, www.ceskenoviny.cz 28 August 2001 and 27 July 2003, “Klaus describes adoption of euro “unreasonable”.

[19] www.ceskenoviny.cz 21 July 2003, “Klaus describes adoption of euro “unreasonable”.

[20] Interview, Vladimir Mlynar, ”Mackova diagnoza, ODS potrebuje nejen noveho vudce, ale i nový program”, Respekt 15-21 September 1997:38.

[21] www.ceskenoviny.cz 20 June 2002, ”Klaus says he will offer resignation as ODS head at conference”.

[22] www.ods.cz/analyza 21.10.2002

[23] Czech Press Survey 5 November 2002, www.ceskenoviny.cz

[24] www.ceskenoviny.cz 24 July 2003, ”Czech press survey”.

[25] Peter Fischer, www.ceskenoviny.cz 5 December 2002.

[26] www.ceskenoviny.cz 16 December 2002, ”Czech press survey”.

[27] Interview with D. Kroupa from ODA in Rudé Pravo 28.9. 1993:1-2, ”ODA se od ODS lisi predstavami o konecnem výsledku transformace”.

[28] The circumstances in ODA have been analysed several times in the Czech press, e.g. in the daily Hospodarske Noviny 13. 11. 1997, ”Spory v ODA souveseji se stavem ceske pravice a s precenenim charismatických vlastnosti”, in the same daily 17.11. 1997:3m ”Jediny uchaze o vedeni J. Skalický”.