LIST OF PUBLICATIONS
(updated September 2009)
NOTE: Downloading, copying, or printing for, or on behalf of, any
for-profit commercial firm or other commercial purpose should not be done
without the explicit permission of the corresponding publisher.
Articles:
(33) Orshan, G., and P. Sudhölter (2010), The positive
core of a cooperative game, forthcoming of the International Journal of Game
Theory, also Discussion
Paper 268, Center for Rationality, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 26
pp.
(32) Shellshear, E., and P. Sudhölter (2009), On core stability, vital coalitions, and extentability,
Games and Economic Behavior 67, 633 – 644, Download
(31) Holzman, R., B. Peleg, and P. Sudhölter (2007), Bargaining sets of majority voting games, Mathematics of Operations Research 32, 857 – 872, Download.
(30) Hoffmann, M., and P. Sudhölter (2007), The Shapley value of exact assignment games, International Journal of Game Theory 35, 557 – 568, Download.
(29) Raghavan, T.E.S., and P. Sudhölter (2006), On assignment games, in Advances in Dynamic Games with Applications to Economics, Management Science, Engineering, and Environmental Management, ed. by A. Haurie, S. Muto, L. A. Petrosjan, and T. E. S. Raghavan, vol. 8 of Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games, pp. 163 – 179, Birkhäuser.
(28) Peleg, B., and P. Sudhölter (2005), On bargaining sets and voting games, in Proceedings of the Fourth Twente Workshop on Cooperative Games joint with the 3rd Dutch-Russian Symposium, CTIT, University of Twente, ed. by T.S.H. Driessen, J.B. Timmer, A.B. Khmelnitskaya, 89 – 104.
(27) Raghavan, T.E.S., and P. Sudhölter (2005), The modiclus and core stability, International Journal of Game Theory 33, 467 – 478, Download.
(26) Peleg, B., and P.
Sudhölter (2005), On the non-emptiness of the Mas-Colell bargaining set, Journal of Mathematical Economics 41, 1060 - 1068, Download.
(25) Rosenmüller, J., and P. Sudhölter (2004), Cartels via the modiclus, Discrete
Applied Mathematics 134, 263 – 302, Download.
(24) Orshan, G., and P. Sudhölter (2003), Reconfirming
the prenucleolus, Mathematics
of Operations Research 28, 283 - 293, Download.
(23) Peleg, B., and P. Sudhölter (2002), The dummy paradox of the
bargaining set, in Game Theory and
Applications 8, ed. by L. A. Petrosjan and V. V. Mazalov, pp. 119 - 124, also International Journal of
Mathematics, Game Theory, and Algebra 12, 443 - 446, also Discussion Paper 256, Center
for Rationality, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
(22) Rosenmüller, J., and P. Sudhölter (2002), Formation of cartels
in glove markets and the modiclus, Journal of Economics 76, 217 –
246, Download.
(21) Sudhölter, P., and B. Peleg (2002), A note
on an axiomatization of the core of market games, Mathematics of Operations Research 27,
441 – 444, Download.
(20) Sudhölter, P., and J. Potters (2001), The semireactive bargaining set of a cooperative game, International Journal of Game Theory 30,
117 – 139, Download.
(19) Sudhölter, P. (2001), Equal treatment for both sides of assignment
games in the modified least core, in Power
Indices and Coalition Formation, ed. by M. Holler and G. Owen, pp. 175 -
202,
(18) Hwang, Y.-A., and P. Sudhölter (2001), Axiomatizations
of the core on the universal domain and other natural domains, International Journal of Game Theory 29,
597 – 623, Download.
(17) Sudhölter, P., and B. Peleg (2000), The
positive prekernel of a cooperative game, International Game Theory Review 2, 287
– 305, Download.
(16) Sudhölter, P., J. Rosenmüller, and B. Peleg (2000), The canonical extensive form of a game form: Part II -
Representation, Journal of Mathematical
Economics 33, 299 - 338, Download.
(15) Peleg, B., and P. Sudhölter (1999), Single-peakedness
and coalition-proofness, Review of
Economic Design 4, 381 - 387, Download.
(14) Potters, J., and P. Sudhölter (1999), Airport problems and consistent
solution rules, Mathematical Social
Sciences 38, 83 – 102, Download.
(13) Peleg, B., J. Rosenmüller, and P. Sudhölter (1999), The
canonical extensive form of a game form: Part I - Symmetries, in Current Trends in Economics: Theory and
Applications, Studies in Economic Theory 8, ed. by A. Alkan,
C.D. Aliprantis, and N.C. Yannelis,
pp. 367 - 387, Springer Publishers, also Discussion Paper 186, Center
for Rationality, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
(12) Sudhölter, P. (1998), Axiomatizations of
game theoretical solutions for one-output cost sharing problems, Games and Economic Behavior 24, 142
– 171, Download.
(11) Sudhölter, P., and B. Peleg (1998), Nucleoli as maximizers
of collective satisfaction functions, Social
Choice and Welfare 15, 383 - 411, Download, Erratum.
(10) Sudhölter, P. (1997), Nonlinear self dual solutions for TU-games, in
Game Theoretical Applications to
Economics and Operations Research, ed. by T. Parthasarathy,
B. Dutta, J.A.M. Potters, T.E.S. Raghavan, D. Ray,
and A. Sen, pp. 33-50, Kluwer
Academic Publishers.
(9) Sudhölter, P. (1997), The modified nucleolus:
Properties and axiomatizations, International Journal of Game Theory 26, 147 – 182, Download.
(8) Peleg, B., and P. Sudhölter (1997), An axiomatization of Nash equilibria
in economic situations, Games and
Economic Behavior 18, 277 – 285, Download.
(7) Sudhölter, P. (1996), Star-shapedness of the
kernel for homogeneous games, Mathematical
Social Sciences 32, 179 – 214, Download.
(6) Sudhölter, P. (1996), The modified nucleolus
as canonical representation of weighted majority games, Mathematics of Operations Research 21, 734 – 756, Download.
(5) Krohn,
(4) Peleg, B., J. Rosenmüller, and P. Sudhölter (1994), The kernel of
homogeneous games with steps, in Essays
in Game Theory in Honor of Michael Maschler, ed.
by N. Megiddo, pp. 163 - 192,
(3) Rosenmüller, J., and P. Sudhölter (1994), The
nucleolus of homogeneous games with steps, Discrete
Applied Mathematics 50, 53 – 76, Download.
(2) Krohn,
(1) Sudhölter, P. (1989), Homogeneous games as anti step functions, International Journal of Game Theory 18,
433 – 469, Download.
Monographs:
(2) Second extended edition (2007). Springer,
Berlin/Heidelberg/
(1) Peleg, B., and P. Sudhölter (2003), Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games. Theory and Decision Library, Series C, Kluwer
Academic Publishers, Boston/Dordrecht/London, 378 pp.
Working and Discussion Papers:
(4) Peleg, B., and P. Sudhölter (2004), Bargaining sets of voting games, Discussion Paper 376, Center
for Rationality, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 10 pp.
(3) Sudhölter, P. (1994), Solution concepts for C-convex, assignment, and
M2-games, Working Paper 232, Institute of Mathematical Economics, University of
Bielefeld, 28 pp.
(2) Sudhölter, P. (1993), Independence for characterizing axioms of the
pre-nucleolus, Working Paper 220, Institute of Mathematical Economics,
University of Bielefeld, 12 pp.
(1) Sudhölter, P. (1986), Construction of homogeneous zero-sum games,
Working Paper 144, Institute of Mathematical Economics, University of
Bielefeld, 43 pp.
Theses:
(1) Sudhölter, P. (1993), The Modified Nucleolus of a Cooperative Game,
Habilitation Thesis, Department of Economics, University of Bielefeld, 80 pp.
(2) Sudhölter, P. (1988), Classification of Homogeneous Games, Doctoral
Thesis (PhD Thesis), Department of Mathematics, University of
(3) Kurth, P. R., and P. Sudhölter (1982), Selbstinjektive
darstellungsendliche Algebren
vom Typ B_n,
Diploma Thesis, Department of
Mathematics, University of Bielefeld, 191 pp.