

# Kantian Dreams

A Constructivist Critique of Mainstream Research on Political Cooperation  
Within Europe

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## 1. INTRODUCTION

The year 1999 will go down in history as one of the defining moments in the continual process of European integration. Europe introduced its single-currency, which by all accounts is having dramatic effects on the global economy and it also formulated its framework for the adoption of the Common European Security and Defense Policy (CESDP)<sup>1</sup>. It is the latter development which is of interest to the present discussion. What effects will the CESDP have on the political integration of the union? Will it function as a “ratcheting-up” mechanism much in the way the Amsterdam treaty was expected to function? Perhaps such a proposition is teleological, as well as an oversimplification, but I have asked these questions because I believe that the CESDP proposal has re-ignited the debate surrounding European political cooperation. CESDP has caused many analysts of European Politics to stand up and take notice of the rapid change of pace that has gone on in the first full year in which the Amsterdam Treaty amendments to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) have officially been in force<sup>2</sup>. Much of the debate however has unfortunately remained within what some scholars call the domain of “mainstream international relations”. This means that the debates surrounding European political cooperation center around rationalist\individualist interpretations where the nation-state is the central actor and “high” politics are defined in terms of military objectives, “security dilemmas”, and diplomacy<sup>3</sup>. This point of view is evident in Christopher Hill’s landmark article on the “capabilities-expectations gap” (CEG) which has defined the debate on the European Union’s (EU) foreign policy aspirations for the last decade. Many scholars agree with the rationale that for the time being, Europe cannot develop a common foreign and security policy because its capabilities-in the form of material forces, and institutional structures do not match up with the expectations of both certain member states and third parties. In short the EU’s economic strength cannot be converted into political strength<sup>4</sup> because it lacks the necessary means to do so.

This article argues that the Capabilities-Expectations Gap is under-specified because Hill’s conceptualization is lacking an element which I believe to be crucial to any IR theory. CEG ignores the ideational side of the argument in that it does not take into account how the idea of a common foreign policy can have constitutive effects on individual actors’ identities and interests. Like many neo-realist or neo-liberal accounts, actor’s interests are fixed and any variation that exists is the variation in behavior which can be changed due to factors such as the constraining effects of “anarchy”<sup>5</sup> or the “power” of material forces. In this instance, ideas are a variable that “mop up” any remaining explanation. My argument is not to stress the ideational over the material, thereby continuing unnecessary bickering over which variables matter more. Instead I take the view that the material and ideational factors are always at play in any construction of social reality and as such my question from a conceptual point of view is to ask

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<sup>1</sup> See the final declaration of the “Helsinki European Council Conclusions”: Council of the EU, 1999.

<sup>2</sup> For a general discussion on some of the possible impacts of the new CESDP see articles such as: Andreani G: “*Why Institutions Matter*” in Survival, Vol.42\2, pp.81-95, Summer 2000; Gordon P.H: “*Their Own Army? Making European Defense Work*” in Foreign Affairs, pp.12-17, July\August 2000.

<sup>3</sup> For a critical discussion of mainstream International Relations theory see : Der Derian J: “*Introduction: Critical Investigations*” in Der Derian J (ed.): “International Theory: Critical Investigations”, McMillan Press, London, pp.1-11, 1995.

<sup>4</sup> Hill C: “*The Capabilities-Expectations Gap or Conceptualizing Europe’s International Role*” in Journal of Common Market Studies, vol.31\3, pp.305-328, 1993. ;Hill C: “*Closing the Capabilities-Expectations Gap?*” in Peterson J. & Sjursen H (eds.): “A Common Foreign Policy for Europe: Competing Visions of the CFSP” Routledge, London UK, pp.18-38, 1998; Forster A. & Wallace W: “*Common Foreign and Security Policy: A New Policy or Just a New Name*” in Wallace H. & Wallace W. (eds.): “Policy Making in the European Union”, Oxford University Press, Oxford UK, 1996; Holland M (ed.): “Common Foreign and Security Policy”, Pinter Publishing, London UK, 1997; Smith M.E: “*What’s wrong with the CFSP? The Politics of Institutional Reform*” in Laurent P.H. & Maresceau M. (eds.): “The State of European Union, Volume 4”, Lynne Rienner, Boulder CO, 1998.

<sup>5</sup> The classic account is by Waltz K: “*Theory of International Politics*”, Addison Wesley, Boston, 1979.

how relevant are ideational forces in the creation of a common security policy?<sup>6</sup> Do they make more of a difference in this case?

With these questions in mind, the discussion will proceed along the following lines. First I shall present a framework of how one can understand the constitutive effects of ideas on identities and interests. Borrowing from the work of Alexander Wendt, I shall argue that “structural constructivism”<sup>7</sup> with its emphasis on interaction and the structural constraint of the “distribution of ideas” allows us to examine how the increasingly cooperative interaction amongst EU member states can change the identities and interests of the actors involved in the process. The following section shall then discuss the implications of the structural constructivist framework on the formation of a common or collective security identity. The principle point I want to discuss is the notion that past historical practices are an essential ingredient in any re-constitution of identity and interests. If the claim-that the EU is one of the only examples of a “Kantian culture of anarchy” which epitomizes a “culture” of “friendship and collectivity”-is correct, then perhaps this regional structure (within the larger international system) provides the framework of possibility for a collective security identity to be created. Once again borrowing from Wendt, I shall try to operationalize four “master” variables that he has offered as essential elements that are necessary for collective identity formation to occur. The four variables are: interdependence, homogeneity, common-fate, and self-restraint<sup>8</sup>. A historical analysis will be my framework for examining the existence of the four “master variables”. Three periods will be studied in the history of foreign policy cooperation in Europe: the period of European Political Cooperation (EPC) dating from the early 1970s to 1991; the aftermath of the Treaty of Maastricht (TEU) from 1992-1997; and finally the post Treaty of Amsterdam years from 1997 to the present. My point of examining these three periods is to demonstrate that the interaction process among actors was increasingly cooperative and that three out of the four variables outlined above were increasingly important. Finally as a conclusion, I shall attempt to bring the discussion back full-circle and offer some suggestions as to why analyses such as the CEG must be supplemented by insight into the constitutive role of ideas, culture, and identity. Without a discussion as to how ideas create and shape interests, discussions about a common foreign and security policy for Europe will always remain incomplete. An incorporation of a constructivist account may be a way of enriching the analysis of political cooperation in Europe. However, before proceeding further, I would like to stress that my critique of rationalist accounts of European cooperation are not about privileging ideas over institutions or material forces. Instead, my view is that ideas, identity, and interests otherwise referred to as a social ontology, have been neglected within European integration studies and as such deserve more attention<sup>9</sup>.

## **2. Constructivism’s Core Beliefs**

There are three main elements of constructivism which make it a distinct form of theorizing in IR<sup>10</sup>. First, international politics is said to be shaped by the intersubjective understandings, shared ideas, norms and values held by actors. Intersubjective knowledge is of importance because it emphasizes the social dimension of human existence. More specifically, intersubjective understandings create structures that

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<sup>6</sup> CEG has provided students of IR and European studies with an elegant and sophisticated account of how material forces shape the construction of a common security policy. Therefore it is not my intention to attack the CEG, nor would I presume myself capable of doing so.

<sup>7</sup> I use the term to differentiate Wendt’s constructivism from other variants of constructivism such as the neo-classical version of Nicholas Onuf. For an account of the differing versions of constructivism see: Ruggie J.G: “*What Makes the World Hang Together?*” in *Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization*, 1998.

<sup>8</sup> See Chapter 7 of Wendt A: “*Social Theory of International Politics*” Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999.

<sup>9</sup> I would like to thank Otto Holman, for pointing out that other theoretical frameworks such as Transnational Historical Materialism have important contributions to make to the study of European integration. My article does not seek to reject other competing theories, it is simply an attempt to demonstrate the contribution made by social constructivism by highlighting the ideational and bracketing the material.

<sup>10</sup> I use the capital letters IR to denote the academic discipline of International Relations and from hereon in, I will use the small letters “ir” to refer to the actual relations between actor at the international level.

constrain, shape and ultimately constitute behavior<sup>11</sup>. Constructivists can then use these structures as a separate causal force distinct from the material structures of realist theories.

Second, ideational structures do not just have a regulative effect, but also a constitutive effect. This means that the identities and interests of actors are constituted (or re-constituted) through interaction in a process of “socialization”. Therefore in contrast to realist theories such as neorealism, which regard interests as fixed in an effort to extricate the causal roles of power and material capabilities, constructivism takes into account how culture and ideas shape the way actors define themselves, in other words, who they are, what their goals are, as well as the roles that they attribute to themselves within social interaction<sup>12</sup>.

Finally, social structures and “agents”<sup>13</sup> are mutually constituted by each other. This point is borrowed heavily from Giddens’s “structuration” theory, which essentially says that structures constitute actors in terms of their interests and identities, but structures are also produced and re-produced by the discursive practices of agents. Structures therefore are not reified objects of which actors have no control over; instead, actors are in a constant dynamic relationship with structures. Therefore structures can only exist through the agency of actors, which means that structures are not fixed but can be changed.

Together, the three elements of constructivism highlight the need to recognize that the realities of actors are temporally contingent as well as being temporally constructed. Reality is a product of human endeavor and can be transformed through a change in the pattern of human activity and behavior (through a change in social practices). Of course the process of change may be slow because in almost all situations, agents must face up to thousands of years of socialization. However even the most internalized structures can be altered by human agency. In the end, what is most important to recognize is that in contrast to the mainstream theories of IR, constructivism questions the presumption that there are universal laws of international politics operating across space and time and thus new approaches to theorizing about international politics must be proffered.<sup>14</sup>

### The World According to Wendt: Structural theorizing using a constructivist argument

Building on the previous discussion of constructivism’s core principles, structural constructivism, posits that the Waltzian claim that interests are shaped by the ordering principle of anarchy is false<sup>15</sup>. Instead, anarchy is simply defined as the absence of a central authority and as such has no “one logic”. Rather the way one form of anarchy or another will develop, ultimately rests on how the distribution of interests are arranged within the system<sup>16</sup>. Therefore what is doing most of the explanatory work in Waltz’s theory is not necessarily the distribution of capabilities but the more implicit or hidden variable: the distribution of interests. Are states status-quo seekers? Are they revisionists? Material capabilities therefore have no real explanatory weight unless they interact with the ideational structure which is the distribution of interests. Socialized beliefs about what kind of objectives are worth pursuing or avoiding will determine

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<sup>11</sup> See Checkel J: “*The Constructivist turn in International Relations Theory*” in European Journal of International Relations, Vol.50\2 pp.324-348, 1998; Adler E: “*Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics*” in European Journal of International Relations, Vol.3\3, pp. 319-363, 1997.

<sup>12</sup> See Klotz A.: “*Norms Reconstituting Interests: Global Racial Equality and U.S. Sanctions against South Africa*” in International Organization, Vol.49\3 pp.451-478, Summer 1995.

<sup>13</sup> I use the term “agent” synonymously with “actor”. However it should be noted that “agent” has been specifically defined as a person who actively takes part in society and this creates difficulties for constructivist claims that states can be considered agents. See Onuf N., Kowert P., and Kubalkova V: “*Constructing Constructivism*” in International Relations in a Constructed World, M.E Sharpe, London, Armonk, New York, 1998.

<sup>14</sup> See Wendt, A: “*Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics*” in International Organization, Vol.46\2, pp.391-425, 1992.

<sup>15</sup> Waltz claims that anarchy forces states to become “like units” in that they must always think about their own survival. This constant need to think about survival makes the system a “self-help” system which engenders fixed interests of increasing one’s own military strength in order to deter possible aggressors. See Waltz K: “Theory of International Politics”, Addison-Wesley, Boston Mass., 1979.

<sup>16</sup> As stated above, states can and will develop interests other than the basic interests needed for self-reproduction. These “subjective” interests are largely a product of social interaction. See Wendt A: “Social Theory of International Politics” Ch.5.

each states' actual interests. So while individuals and states may have certain basic needs (such as survival, self esteem, or autonomy), how these needs are manifested will be a function of social discursive practices. But how are interests formulated? This question is answered by examining interaction.

Structural constructivism argues that anarchy in actual fact creates three possible "cultures", which generates actor's interests. In each culture, states play certain role types vis-a vis each other, complete with specific behavioral norms. The "Hobbesian" culture, which according to Wendt, lasted until the seventeenth century, was characterized by states casting roles about each other as "enemies". The other was a threatening actor which had no desire to curb the use of violence to achieve its goals. The "Lockean" culture, in existence since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, is more restrained in that states see each other as rivals that may use violence to advance their goals, but are required to refrain from eliminating each other due to the concept of sovereignty. Finally a "Kantian" culture, which may or may not be forming within Europe, is characterized by states casting roles in which the other is a "friend". This means that states do not use force to settle disputes and at the same time security as a goal is tackled collectively rather than individually.<sup>17</sup>

Thus the manner in which states interact with each other, whether they are regarded as "enemy", "rival", or "friend" will determine how their interests are shaped. In addition, this interaction will condition any future interaction as the "culture" becomes internalized within the minds of the individual actors. "Anarchy is what states make of it". The culture a state finds itself in will depend on the discursive practices that reproduce or transform each actor's view of self and other and as such cultures cannot be considered reified "givens". Instead cultures are products of historical social processes. If today's common assumption is that the world is "self-help" and populated by egoistic actors, this is a function of historically contingent ideas and not necessarily a description of the inherent characteristics of a state.<sup>18</sup> By changing their interaction towards one another, states can create new ideational structures that help them solve collective action problems or historical mistrust.

The possible change of cultures within the international system opens up new avenues for the analyst interested in how security identity and policies are constructed in the EU. As stated above, Wendt believes that a Kantian culture may be emerging out of what was once a Lockean Culture in Europe. If such is the case, then one should expect even more cooperation amongst the member states. Added to this is the fact that the identities of the EU member states may in fact be changing to reflect the new culture of cooperation. In essence, exploring these possibilities is at the heart of my project and I seek to show that contrary to many leading scholars on EU foreign and security studies, the necessary component of a common security policy-a common-identity- may be emerging. The structural constructivist framework provides a useful point of entry, however one point still needs some clarification. It is not enough to simply state that interaction can change cultures and therefore actors' interests. This would leave open the criticism that there is no specification as to how interaction brings about change. In the next section I shall address how structural constructivism tackles this issue.

It is not enough to simply state that interaction can lead to change in the culture which constitutes identities and interests. What is missing is an explanation of how interaction leads to change. This is because at the end of the day, constructivism in general says that both structure (culture) and agency are products of what people *do*.<sup>19</sup> Therefore a detailed analysis of the interaction process is an important aspect of any complete constructivist theory. In this section, I shall discuss how structural constructivism outlines the process of interaction. It is my belief that this examination of process makes structural constructivism an improvement on existing constructivist theories because it allows a researcher to test concrete variables in a positivist sense against empirical evidence. Structural constructivism goes beyond meta-theory and permits researchers to answer first order questions about the "real" world out there.

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<sup>17</sup> Ibid. pp. 258, 260-262, 279-280, 298-299.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid. pp. 296-297.

<sup>19</sup> Onuf N: "*Constructivism: A User's Manual*" in "*International Relations in a Constructed World*", M.E. Sharpe Publishing, London UK, 1998.

In essence structural constructivism borrows a symbolic interactionist framework to outline the process of interaction<sup>20</sup>. The summary of the argument is that the identities and interests of actors are learned and then reinforced in response to how actors are treated by significant “Others”. This process of “learning” is known as “reflected appraisals” or “mirroring” because it is hypothesized that actors will come to see themselves as a reflection of how they think others perceive them. If the “Other” thinks that the self is an enemy, then the self will “appraise” her own identity vis-à-vis the other as an enemy<sup>21</sup>. Unpacking this summary, two points are singled out by structural constructivism. The first is that actors have preconceived notions about themselves and the “Other”, which shape the interaction process. Preconceived notions are based upon some of the basic needs that individuals (in this case states) require in order to survive (such as autonomy, or physical survival). This does not mean that these needs produce egoistic tendencies, but it does mean that any identities that conflict with these needs will be much more difficult to learn, and as such these needs form a material constraint on identity formation. Preconceived notions can also be formulated by how we think of ourselves and the “Other” prior to interaction.<sup>22</sup> Through these preconceived ideas we will then assign “roles” to ourselves and the “Other”.

This function has a dynamic quality to it: “Role taking” implies that the Self chooses between several possibilities in regards to who she will be (I am a king, a politician, a banker, a priest)<sup>23</sup> and as such, what interests will be developed. When the Self chooses a role for herself, she is also at the same time “casting” the other in a counter-role so as to give her identity meaning. In essence this is simply a necessity for the interaction process to take place. One cannot be a professor without students; one cannot be a bartender without patrons.<sup>24</sup> It should be noted that both actors in an encounter would select roles for themselves and cast counter roles for the “Other”, thereby creating different understandings of the situation. Thus the goal of the interaction process is to communicate these understandings of the situation in a manner that will allow the interaction process to proceed smoothly.<sup>25</sup>

Once the interaction process starts however, the identities and interests need not remain constant<sup>26</sup>, they may indeed undergo a transformation (for good or bad). This is done by the “Self” taking some action based on the role she has chosen for herself and the counter-role she has assigned to the “Other”. Based on this action, “Other”- in the context of the preconceived notions he has brought to the interaction process; an assessment of Self’s action, and possible prior shared common understandings-will take some action of his own. If the “Self’s” ideas have changed then some learning will have taken place. Assuming that learning has taken place, and that “Other” takes some form of action based on this learning process, the “Self” will also try to interpret “Other’s” action and possibly “recast” the counter role for “Other”. This process will repeat itself “until both actors come to know each other, changing a distribution of knowledge that was initially only privately held (a mere social structure) into one that is at least partly shared (a culture)”<sup>27</sup>.

Taking this interaction process into the realm of IR, one can see how Realist practices gain saliency. If “Self” and “Other” both see themselves as objects which can be manipulated or take roles as “egoists”, then they will both disregard their security needs. This will have the effect of both actors “casting” similar roles about each other in the sense that they are people who cannot be trusted and that they may even be dangerous. As such, both actors will continue to accept their “egoistic” identities and continue to act in

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<sup>20</sup> Symbolic interaction is the social theory of interaction advocated in the work of George Hebert Mead. For a detailed account of the theory see Mead G.H: “Mind, Self, and Society” University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1934 and Blumer H: “Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Method”, Prentice Hall Publishing, Englewood Cliffs NJ, 1969.

<sup>21</sup> See Wendt A: “Social Theory of International Politics” Chapter 7.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid. pp. 329.

<sup>23</sup> This selection of roles will be heavily limited based on pre-existing shared understandings (as a student, I could go to an academic conference and try to be a professor but I probably would not succeed).

<sup>24</sup> “Role-taking” and “Alter-casting” are terms Wendt has borrowed from the symbolic-interactionist theoretical framework. See Schwalbe M: “Role Taking Reconsidered: Linking Competence and Performance to Social Structure”, in Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior, Vol.18, pp.411-436, 1988.

<sup>25</sup> Wendt A: “Social Theory Of International Politics” pp.330-331.

<sup>26</sup> This does not mean that change is easy, it is simply to state that ideas and interests can change through interaction. The key question, which is an empirical question, is when and how do identities and interests change?

<sup>27</sup> Wendt A: “Social Theory” pp. 331.

such a manner thus reinforcing and reproducing both the identities and interests of each actor. After some time, these processes become internalized, thus locking both actors into roles as “enemies” and creating a Realist culture. The way out then of the “Realist self fulfilling prophecy”<sup>28</sup> is to try and change the interaction process from one in which actors cast themselves as “enemies” to a process in which they cast themselves as “rivals” or “friends” (even though there may be a high risk involved and even though it may be difficult to achieve in practice).

The presentation of the interaction process to this point has focused on the micro-structural impact of interaction between actors. However, as structural constructivism posits, micro-structural change (the change of identities and interests) does not necessarily equate to a change in the macro level structure, in that identity change and structural change are not the same. Nevertheless the former is necessary for the latter to occur. This is because it is not enough for simply two actors in a system to change their identities in order to bring about systemic or structural change, Rather a critical mass of actors must change their identities in order for there to be systemic change. Based on this assumption, structural constructivism proffers four “master” variables which might bring about a positive change of identities in the international system. The four variables are: interdependence, common-fate, homogeneity, and self-restraint<sup>29</sup>.

Systemic or structural change is difficult to achieve precisely because one’s object of reference is a structure, which means that the existing culture of identities is heavily internalized and “set” in the minds of individuals. If structure were easy to change, then things would be constantly changing and one could not talk about things being “structured” at all. This being said, in international politics, structural constructivism, believes that the four master variables figure greatly in any form of structural change. Of the four variables the concept of self-restraint is the most important. This is because structural constructivism hypothesizes that structural change can occur if any of the first three variables (interdependence, common-fate, homogeneity) are present along with the final variable (self-restraint).<sup>30</sup> In other words, any presence of these variables becomes a permissive cause for structural change.

Self-restraint is more important than the other variables because of the fear that most actors will feel when embarking in a collective endeavor: the fear of being engulfed by the other actors with which they identify. As noted many times above, all actors have individual needs (national interests in the case of states) that are necessary for their self-preservation. Despite the possible benefits of collective identification, individual needs might often come into conflict with the collective needs of the group. Therefore in order to get past this problem, actors must feel secure in the fact that their needs will be taken into consideration in any collective endeavor. Traditionally this problem is solved by third party intervention such as in domestic politics where a government can impose laws. In IR, hegemonic powers may play a similar role and in some cases material technology such as nuclear weapons may create self-restraint (through for example the concept of Mutually Assured Destruction)<sup>31</sup>. Nevertheless, structural constructivism argues that what is actually needed is “a belief that the “Other” will constrain *itself* in the demands it makes on the “Self”...By holding ourselves back, in short, we make it possible for others to step forward and identify with us, enabling us in turn to identify with them.”<sup>32</sup> However this in itself does not create collective identity formation amongst a sufficient group of actors. What is needed is some configuration of the other three variables.

Interdependence essentially means that actors are linked to each other in that the outcomes of their interaction depend on the choices of each actor. For structural constructivism, it is a key variable in producing a change in structure, not because of the behavioral effects interdependence can have on cooperation<sup>33</sup>, but because of the constitutive effects on the actors themselves. The more dense the

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<sup>28</sup> Ibid. pp. 332.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid. pp. 343.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid. pp. 358.

<sup>31</sup> Jervis R: “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma” in World Politics, Vol.30, pp.167-214, 1978.

<sup>32</sup> Wendt. A: “Social Theory”pp.359.

<sup>33</sup> For a rationalist version of the importance of interdependence see Keohane R.O & Nye J: “Power and Interdependence” 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition, 1989.

interaction amongst actors is, the greater the possibility for “role taking” and “alter-casting” (discussed above) to take place and as such for identities to change.<sup>34</sup>

Common Fate is the variable where an actor’s fate depends on what happens to the collective as a whole. This is not the same as interdependence because common fate does not require interaction. In IR a common fate is often equated with a negative event such as the “North” keeping the “South” underdeveloped. Structural constructivism argues that common fate situations can be constructed through the leadership of “epistemic communities” or “policy entrepreneurs”<sup>35</sup> and thus lead to collective identity formation in a large number of actors. This is done by these “leaders” reframing how actors come to understand themselves or through the communication acts of persuading actors that a common cause is important enough to create a “we” feeling in a group.

Finally, Homogeneity is the degree in which actors see themselves as being alike. This does not mean that if actors categorize themselves as being alike that collective identity formation is possible, but it can help the collective identification process along. The structural constructivist hypothesis here is that as all actors begin to see themselves as alike the possibility increases for collective identity formation to occur. Actors (states) begin to see themselves as being alike in that their “type” identities begin to converge. This means that their internal (domestic) characteristics begin to become similar<sup>36</sup> in that their political systems may become the same (democratic states) or their economic systems are identical (command economy states). This similitude of characteristics promotes collective identity formation by reducing the need for egoistic role casting which is a product of the “Self” assuming that the “Other” will not care for “Self’s” needs.

As I have argued above, the presence of these variables within the context of European cooperation provides the permissive cause for structural (re: cultural) change. In the next section I shall focus on three specific instances of political cooperation with the purpose of demonstrating the emergence of three of the four master variables posited by Wendt. It is my belief that the history of European foreign policy cooperation has generated increasingly collectivized conceptions of how to conduct foreign policy. Can this create a collective security identity? What I hope to show by the following historical exposition is that a Kantian culture of friendship will form the enabling pathway by which a common or collective identity is possible. Before proceeding I want to comment on what I mean by “collective identity”. A collective identity is one of the foremost elements that is thought to be lacking for a common foreign and security policy to develop in Europe<sup>37</sup>, yet it is my contention that this is ultimately a misplaced claim. As Laffan has argued, the EU provides the opportunity for multiple identities to exist side by side through the extension of political space beyond the nation-state. Thus national identities are not replaced, rather they become part of a hierarchy of identities encompassing local, regional, national, and supranational identities<sup>38</sup>. Based on this line of argumentation, I believe that any emergent collective identity would sit side by side alongside other identities. Which identity takes precedence is an empirical question, but for the present discussion, I believe that an examination of the history will show that not only is collective identity formation possible, but that it has already begun in Europe.

### **3. Has Europe adopted a “Kantian Culture”?**

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<sup>34</sup> It should be noted that realists have argued that increased interdependence causes a greater fear of exploitation. While this may be correct, the variable of “self restraint” goes a long way in reducing this fear. For a realist critique of interdependence see Grieco J: “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: a Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism” in *International Organization*, vol.42, pp.485-508, 1988.

<sup>35</sup> Wendt A: “Social Theory” pp. 353.

<sup>36</sup> This rationale is the foundation of the Democratic Peace Theory advocated first by Kant and then in its modern variation by Michael Doyle et.al. For a thorough exposition of the Democratic Peace theory see: Doyle M: “*Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs part I & II*” in *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, vol.12, pp.205-235 and 323-353.

<sup>37</sup> Allen D: “*Conclusions: The European Rescue of National Foreign Policies?*” in Hill C (ed): “*The Actors in Europe’s Foreign Policy*” Routledge, London UK, 1996.

<sup>38</sup> Laffan B: “*The Politics of Identity and Political Order in Europe*” in *Journal Of Common Market Studies*, vol.34\1, pp.81-101, 1996.

How can we assess whether Europe has incorporated a culture of interaction encompassing friendship and peaceful interaction? One possible way (and the manner adopted here) is to build a historical narrative in order to assess whether or not past experiences and practices have brought about a “culture of friendship”. Before engaging in the historical account, a working definition of a “Kantian Culture” must be clearly stated. In essence, a Kantian culture of anarchy refers to a distribution of ideas that emphasize the consideration of the “other” within the identification of the “self” so that the “other”-instead of being seen as an “enemy” or “rival”- is in fact considered to be a “friend”. More importantly, this “prosocial” configuration of ideas is incorporated into the collective or shared understandings of a group. At the international level, this crude definition, can be understood as actors engendering a “security community”<sup>39</sup> and engaging in a collective security system. Therefore by extension, the historical narrative of political cooperation in Europe should contain increasing instances of the four variables mentioned above: interdependence, homogeneity, common-fate, and self-restraint. Thus with these four variables in mind, I shall begin the historical narrative by focusing on three stages of political cooperation: the creation of European Political Cooperation (EPC), then the developments in the run-up to the signing of the Maastricht treaty, and finally an examination of the present situation will be undertaken. I have chosen these three periods because I believe they are in the first instance important events in the history of European political cooperation and secondly, are able to show how the process has become increasingly more cooperative. In the interest of space (and reader interest), I shall not try to give a chronological account of events<sup>40</sup> but instead will focus on key events within each period. As a foil to my argument, I will choose those events that were characterized as “failures” in order to demonstrate that despite policy failures a deeper process of identity\interest change was beginning to take shape.

### 3.1. The beginnings of EPC: The Middle-East:

EPC as an institution was first created out of the developments of the Hague Conference of 1969 but came to be formalized in the Luxembourg Report of 1970. Its essential function was to coordinate foreign policy positions through an institutionalized consultation process without actually creating a formal institutional base. Its intergovernmental character was a result of the insistence of countries such as France that political cooperation should not fall under the purview of the supranational decision-making structure found in the European Community (what is now referred to as Pillar I)<sup>41</sup>. One of the first foreign policy issues to fall in the laps of the EPC officials was the Middle-East problem arising out of France wanting to formally coordinate a European policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. In the 1956 Suez Crisis, France had intervened on behalf of Israel but by the time the 1967 Arab-Israeli war broke out, they were clearly on the side of the Arabs. De Gaulle had two reasons for this shift in policy: The first was that he wanted to preserve France’s economic interests, especially in Northern Africa, but perhaps more importantly, De Gaulle was determined to adopt a policy which was different from the US policy<sup>42</sup>. In contrast, countries like Germany and the Netherlands were more sympathetic to the Israeli cause. This divergence of policy and the fact that the European Community (EC) lacked any formal mechanisms of consultation resulted in the lack of any debate of the crisis. This was especially problematic given the fact that there had been an EC summit several days prior to the outbreak of the war in June 1967. The lack of cohesion is said to have been one of the prime reasons why the EC eventually decided that some form of consultation among the member-states must take place.

Consequently, apprehension and uncertainty could be said to have characterized the setting of the Munich meeting in 1970, however within six months of the meeting, the Schumann document was agreed upon marking the beginning of a unified position vis-à-vis the Middle-East crisis whereby the national

<sup>39</sup> Deutsch K, et. al : “Political Community and the North Atlantic Area” Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1957.

<sup>40</sup> There are many excellent historical assessments of political cooperation in Europe. One example providing a chronological account is: Nuttall, S.J: “European Political Cooperation”, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1992.

<sup>41</sup> Bretherton C & Vogler J: “*Towards a Common Foreign and Security Policy*” in “The European Union as a Global Actor” Routledge, London & New York, 1999.

<sup>42</sup> Kodmani-Darwish B: “*La France et Le Moyen-Orient: Entre Nostalgie et Realisme*” in Politique Etrangere, 4, 1995.

positions of Germany and the Netherlands had been altered. Despite the failings of the Schumann document, the fact remained that all the EC member-states desired some form of common position (even a simple declaration) based on consultations and careful deliberation<sup>43</sup>. Some scholars such as Allen, Rummel and Wessels have argued that the Schumann document allowed member states such as Germany to alter their policies without attracting too much opposition from within and without by claiming that they were acting in the interest of community solidarity<sup>44</sup>. Whether this is in fact correct, the point is that the EC members had decided that consultation on political issues was a useful exercise.

Once the October War of 1972 broke out, EPC was faced with a much larger crisis. In fact the responses to the conflict initially came not from EPC but from the member states acting independently. France once again sided with the Arabs, while at the other end of the spectrum, the Netherlands sided with its traditional ally, Israel. The Arab response was decisive as they imposed an oil embargo on all member states that opposed their position. The UK and France were considered allies and as such they were excluded from the embargo, whereas the USA and the Netherlands were considered enemies and therefore were subject to the embargo. The outcome of some EC members falling prey to the embargo and some not was not acceptable to the EC members. Thus it was agreed that some form of common response was necessary. As a result a new declaration was issued which called for an acknowledgement of the rights of the Palestinian peoples. As a result of this new EC declaration, the Arab countries reduced the oil cutbacks to the European states with the exception of the Netherlands which was still faced with an oil embargo. Despite the fact that one of its members was facing a stiff embargo, the other EC members did nothing to alleviate the situation beyond the issuing of declarations. In short, community solidarity had not taken root<sup>45</sup>.

A far more serious problem was brewing which would further limit community harmony. Following the rapprochement with the Arab position, The USA began to raise objections towards EC policy in the Middle East. The US wanted the EC to take a more pro-American position in order to present a “united front” vis-à-vis the Arabs. In the end the US won the day. The “Euro-Arab dialogue”, which the EC established with the Arab League, did not contain any political elements. The United States made it very clear that anything more in terms of political cooperation with the Arabs would jeopardize the trans-Atlantic alliance. The EC faced the same pressure from the US in its preparation of the Venice Declaration in 1980<sup>46</sup>. It had been hoped that the Venice document might be more comprehensive than the previous common declarations of the EC, however this was not to be the case. The US government directly intervened in the negotiation process in Venice and as a result, the Venice declaration was as weak as the preceding EC declarations. Because of constant American intervention in EC deliberations, the EC quickly realized that its policy efforts would have to be carefully framed so as to not take opposing positions from the major power of the Atlantic alliance. Thus as an overall assessment, I believe it is safe to say that EC cooperation surrounding the Middle East peace process, although resulting in some limited successes, was largely a failure because the EC would never be allowed to veer from the Cold-war Western position which was by and large a product of American foreign policy.

If one examines the EC efforts in the Middle East with the four “master variables” in mind, then the first major steps of EPC perhaps were not such a complete failure. Perhaps the single greatest accomplishment in the early days of EPC was the institutionalization of interaction. This in turn led to a higher degree of interdependence in political cooperation. By interdependence, I am referring to the density of interaction between actors, or what has been coined by Durkheim as the “dynamic density of society”. “Growth in the volume and dynamic density of societies modifies profoundly the fundamental conditions of the collective existence”<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>43</sup> Nuttall S: “European Political Co-operation”, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992.

<sup>44</sup> Allen D, Rummel R, & Wessels W (eds.): “European Political Cooperation”, Butterworths, London, 1982.

<sup>45</sup> Nuttall S: “*Two decades of EPC performance*” in “Foreign Policy of the European Union: From EPC to CFSP and Beyond”

Regelsberger E, Schoutheete de Tervarent P, & Wessels W. (eds.), Lynne Rienner Publishing, London, 1997.

<sup>46</sup> [www.europa.eu.int](http://www.europa.eu.int) See the EUDOR document retrieval system.

<sup>47</sup> Durkheim E: “The Rules of Sociological Method”, E.G. Catlin (ed.), Free Press, New York, pp.115, 1938 [1895].

For Durkheim, dynamic density referred to the aggregated quantity, speed, and diversity of transactions that occur within society. As such, if these transactions increased, then the fabric of society would change. Society could either form greater collective ties, or conversely, society could also engage in conflict. In the case of the EPC, I argue that the first cooperative efforts within the context of the Middle-East conflicts engendered the beginnings of a culture of cooperation and collectivity.

Innovations, such as the “Coreu” system<sup>48</sup> allowed for diplomats and policy makers within the various ministries of foreign affairs to develop constant communication links with each other. This point and the increasing meetings held between foreign ministry officials created not only “habits of cooperation”<sup>49</sup>, but also instantiated the beginning of the interaction process which is necessary for symbolic interactionism to occur. Taking the variables into account, interdependence increased not only in a physical sense but ideationally as well. However as noted above, interdependence is not a sufficient cause for collective identity formation and ultimately this is why one cannot characterize the early years of EPC as engendering a reconstitution of identity and interests. After all, increased interdependence could simply have been a result of instrumental necessity. However as the next case shall demonstrate, as cooperation deepened with the years, variables such as common-fate and self-restraint began to be noticeable in political cooperation.

### 3.2. The Introduction of the CFSP: Failure in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY)

The outbreak of war in the FRY took place during a critical phase of European integration. Negotiations on political union were taking place at the outset of the war; in 1992, the signing and ratification of The Treaty on European Union (TEU) turned the attention of Western Europe inwards when it should have been more concerned with events in the Balkans; finally, the treaty ratification “crisis” took place during some of the most intense fighting in the FRY. Most, if not all, the scholarly assessments of EU involvement in the Bosnian war are critical of both Europe and the CFSP<sup>50</sup> However this period was supposed to be a time of increased importance for Europe and its role in the international system. Indeed the then President of the European Council stressed that the time had come for Europe to take a decisive role in foreign affairs:

“If one problem can be solved by the Europeans, it is the Yugoslav problem. This is a European country and it is not up to the Americans. It is not up to anyone else”<sup>51</sup>

Based on the role that some members of the EC\EU<sup>52</sup> had accorded themselves in international affairs, it should not come as any surprise that the EC engaged in intense diplomatic activity in the first six months of the crisis. However any discussion of military operations under the auspices of the Western European Union (WEU) were quickly stifled by the Major government in the UK.<sup>53</sup> Nevertheless, the EC was able to implement a ceasefire between the republics of Slovenia and the Yugoslav federal authorities. The Brioni pact as the agreement was called, was signed in July 1991 and was seen as proof that the EC could in fact maintain peace in its near abroad: “[the Brioni Agreement] is proof of the Community’s ability to act”<sup>54</sup>. But the initial positive sentiments were eventually proven wrong as almost all of the diplomatic efforts of

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<sup>48</sup> The Coreu system was a secret Telex system which was set up to allow member state diplomats to exchange information in relative secrecy. Today, Coreu (officially called Cortesy) is based on a sophisticated computerized communication system incorporating high speed fiber optic systems and complex encryption programs. Information acquired through conversation with public relations officer in the Council Secretariat (DGE), 2001.

<sup>49</sup> Bretherton C. & Vogler J: “The European Union as a Global Actor” pp.176, 1999.

<sup>50</sup> See for example Edwards G: “*European Responses to the Yugoslav Crisis: An Interim Assessment*” in Rummel R (ed.): “Toward Political Union” Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden Baden, pp.165-190, 1992; Eyal J: “*Europe and Yugoslavia: Lessons From a Failure*”, Whitehall Paper 19, RUSI, London, 1993;

<sup>51</sup> Poos Jacques-Foreign Minister of Luxembourg. Quoted in Smith C.J: “*Conflict in the Balkans and the Possibility of a European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy*” in International Relations, vol.13\2, pp.1-21, 1996.

<sup>52</sup> I use both terms in this account because the Yugoslav crisis broke out during the period of transition from the European Community to European Union.

<sup>53</sup> Buchan D: “Europe: The Strange Superpower”, Aldershot, Dartmouth, 1993.

<sup>54</sup> German Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher quoted in Agence Europe, July 11<sup>th</sup>, 1991.

the EC fell apart when at the same time Croatia and Yugoslavia (the republic not the federation) intensified their military activities and Germany unilaterally recognized Slovenia and Croatia. The latter was especially damaging for collective action at the European level, largely because there had been prior agreement within EPC that the integrity of the Yugoslav federation should be maintained.

Following the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, Bosnia was recognized by the EC in April of 1992. Very soon afterwards, demonstrating yet again the inability of a common EC position, Macedonia was not recognized as an independent republic due to the insistence of the Greek government, who saw the Macedonian republic as potentially threatening due to irredentist claims. The overall failures of the EC efforts led to an increased presence of the UN in the form of a UN appointed envoy (Cyrus Vance) and a leadership role for the UN in the steering committee of the London Conference of late 1992\1993<sup>55</sup>. Despite the increasing marginalization of the EU (following the entry into force of TEU), European endeavors did bring some results. For example, it was the EU's efforts at the UN, acting on a report by Dame Anne Warburton that brought about the establishment of the first Committee of Experts to investigate "ethnic cleansing", the rape of women, and other atrocities in the former Yugoslavian Federation. This process eventually led to the creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 1993. The EU also undertook to reconstruct and protect the city of Mostar using their own resources as well as pledging to provide and distribute humanitarian aid.<sup>56</sup> Nevertheless the limits of "civilian power" were increasingly being revealed, as humanitarian aid required a significant military force to distribute it within an ongoing war. This fact would eventually lead to an increased role for NATO, which ultimately launched air strikes against Bosnian Serb positions; an increased role for the USA, which would eventually lead the diplomatic efforts to end the war (the Dayton Peace plan); and an increased role for Russia, who had influence over Slobodan Milosevic. EU collective cooperation gradually faded into the shadows and individual member states began to break ranks and take part in more international efforts. The hour of Europe had come and gone and there was not much to show for it.

As stated earlier, most scholars agree that the EU's foreign policy cooperation during the Yugoslav war was found to be wanting. In fact Christopher Hill's article on the Capabilities-Expectation Gap was written during the height of the crisis. However I believe that yet another of Wendt's variables became more prominent as a result of the Yugoslav fiasco. One of the principle lessons learnt from the inability of CFSP to take action in the FRY was a firm resolve from all the EU member states, that CFSP needed to be strengthened, not abandoned. This desire stems in large part because of the development of a new "common fate". Not a common fate of the West versus the rest, but a common fate based on the continuation of the integration process. The common fate that has emerged out of the failures of the EU in the FRY is based on the necessity to withstand what John Mearsheimer has called "Back to the Future" European politics where nationalism and cultures of enmity were prevalent<sup>57</sup>. Ole Waever has argue that the EU can in fact develop a common security identity based in part on this common-fate which becomes the "other" upon which identities of the "self" are created<sup>58</sup>. Europe's past becomes the image which threatens all the people of Europe, the threat is not from the Russians, Americans, or Muslims.

Thus the argument so far is that within the history of political cooperation in Europe, one can point to the creation of certain shared understandings such as a recognition of interdependence as well as a feeling of common fate. Both are essential ingredients in the development of a Kantian culture of friendship. However one ingredient is missing. In order for actors not to feel as if they are making too much of a sacrifice by acknowledging the needs of the "other", there must be some degree of self-restraint. My last historical example shall point to how the EU members have developed self-restraint.

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<sup>55</sup> Edwards G: "*The Potential and Limits of the CFSP: The Yugoslav Example*" in "Foreign Policy of the European Union: From EPC to CFSP and Beyond", pp.173-195, 1997.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid. pp.184.

<sup>57</sup> Mearsheimer J: "*Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War*" in International Security, vol. 15, pp.5-56, 1990a.

<sup>58</sup> Waever O: "*The EU as a Security Actor: Reflections of a Pessimistic Constructivist on Post-Sovereign Security Orders*" in Kelstrup M & Williams M.C (eds.): "International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration: Power, Security and Community", Routledge London, pp.250-294, 2000.

### 3.3. CESDP: Lessons learned from Kosovo:

The third historical example is not so much a description of policy failure but a response to a policy failure. During the Kosovo war of 1999, the EU once again failed to amount any real common position on what action to take against Serbia's ethnic cleansing policies against the ethnic Albanian Kosovars. Instead, NATO took action and launched what became its first offensive operation since its creation. As a result of the "success" of NATO and the obvious failures of the "EU", decision makers in Brussels and member state capitals quickly came to the conclusion that Europe would need to improve its military capabilities if it were going to be able to conduct missions based on the famous "Petersberg tasks"<sup>59</sup>. The realization of a lack of military capabilities coupled with the famous St.Malo declaration where the UK and France pledged to form some form of collective military body prompted the EU as a whole to convene several meetings about the possibility of creating a collective security policy. What emerged from the Helsinki Declaration formulated by the Council of Ministers was a Common European Security and Defense Policy (CESDP)<sup>60</sup>. The CESDP calls for an autonomous defense force comprised of 60,000 troops along with support for a deployment of at least two months to be operational by 2003. In addition the CESDP calls for defense ministers of member states to officially become part of the General Affairs Council, the creation of a Political and Security Committee in order to deal with CESDP planning, and the creation of an EU Military Committee composed of Chiefs of defense from the member states in order to give military advice<sup>61</sup>. These new institutional developments are important for the present discussion because even though self-restraint was present before the creation of CESDP (such as in the agreement not to incorporate CFSP into the community structure but instead to turn the EU into a pillarized structure), it is most apparent in the institutional set-up of the CESDP, particularly in regard to the future relationship between CESDP and NATO. As stated earlier, self-restraint is an essential component for collective identity formation to occur. This is because it allows actors not to feel as if their needs will be subsumed by the needs of the collective which in turn facilitates positive role taking and alter casting (see above).

It is no secret that not all member states of the EU want a supranational type of common security policy. Although it is the UK that finally paved the way for a common security policy to be formed, it is quite apparent that it sees the CESDP as a secondary institution to NATO. This is also reflected most notably in the declarations made by Germany and the Netherlands<sup>62</sup>. Bearing this in mind, the final institutional set-up of the CESDP is a good example of the self-restraint necessary for collective identity formation. For example, in the event of a crisis, actual command might be "sub-contracted" out to NATO military structures such as the Strategic Headquarters for Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE). In addition, the CESDP has provided for a mechanism by which non-EU NATO members will be regularly consulted so that the six member states (Turkey, Norway, Iceland, Poland, Czech Republic, and Hungary) have some input into how the CESDP will be put into practice<sup>63</sup>.

Conversely, intergovernmentalist states have displayed self-restraint by agreeing that the main policy formulations shall be primarily made within the EU architecture keeping in mind the stated aims of the treaty aspirations of the CFSP. This is reflected in the hierarchy of the proposed CESDP institutions. The foremost planning body will be the General Affairs Council within the Council of Ministers. Within this council, the European Commission will have a voice and role to play and so will the High Representative of the CFSP. While these concessions may not represent much of an improvement on the

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<sup>59</sup> The Petersberg Tasks were initially developed as a group of policy initiatives for the WEU in 1992. Subsequently as a means to improve the CFSP, they were incorporated into the CFSP structures through the amendments made to the TEU in the Treaty of Amsterdam. See Rummel R: "*The Intergovernmental Conference 1996: How to Reform CFSP?*" in "Foreign Policy of the European Union: From EPC to CFSP and Beyond", pp.363-381, 1997.

<sup>60</sup> Helsinki European Council Conclusions SN 300/99, Document 6215/1/00 REV 1, DG E VIII, Brussels, Feb. 29<sup>th</sup> 2000.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid. pp.3.

<sup>62</sup> Manners I & Whitman R. G (eds.): "The Foreign Policies of European Union Member States", Manchester University Press, Manchester UK, 2000.

<sup>63</sup> Andreani G: "Why Institutions Matter", pp.91, 2000.

current intergovernmental character to foreign policy coordination, Europeanists can take comfort in that the Commission will be constantly consulted but more importantly, CESDP will have to conform to the general aims of the CFSP.<sup>64</sup>

#### 3.4. In the case of Europe, History is Progressive:

As a summation of my historical exposition, I want to reiterate one important point. I am not making the claim that the aforementioned examples point to a temporal progression in the emergence of the three “master variables” highlighted above. Instead what I have tried to show is that in the case of European cooperation in security matters, history has proven to be progressive in that interdependence, a sense of common fate, and self-restraint have gradually become increasingly internalized within the shared understandings of the EU decision-makers. As a result, the EPC and later the CFSP has produced a shift from a “Lockean” culture of rivalry, in which violence is a legitimate form of settling disputes to a “Kantian” culture of friendship in which violence is not an acceptable form of dispute settlement and where the interests of the “other” are incorporated within the interests of the “self”. In the final section of this article, I shall address some of the ways in which constructivist formulations can produce value-added research and hopefully value-added results.

#### **4. In the End, Its All About Expectations: Some Final Conclusions From a Die-Hard Constructivist:**

One cannot argue with history, The EU has become one of the few successful examples of how international relations do not have to be eternally conflictual. European integration has not only resulted in greater economic cooperation, but it has increasingly resulted in political cooperation. I have tried to argue that structural constructivism, which focuses on the interaction processes of states within the international system in an effort to uncover how identities and interests can change, is a useful addition to theoretical discussions surrounding the issue of a common foreign and security policy for Europe. My reasons for adopting such a position are twofold. Firstly, I believe that constructivist arguments (in whatever variant they may take<sup>65</sup>) are better suited to demonstrating the impact of the transformative process of European integration on European states and more generally on the international system. As I have tried to show above, the identities and interests of the EU member states have not remained fixed; they have changed as the process of integration has continued. Thus, those theories that neglect identity formation or treat it as an exogenous phenomenon will fail to capture one of the more important elements in the development of the EU. Secondly, I wanted to demonstrate that even the most well conceptualized frameworks in the field of political cooperation in Europe (such as the CEG) can be enhanced by “thinking outside the box” and incorporating frameworks that once seemed to be diametrically opposed to the dominating rationalist/neo-realist view<sup>66</sup>.

I believe this second point merits a bit more discussion. As stated above, Christopher Hill’s famous CEG was one of the dominating critiques of the CFSP during the 1990s. His conclusions were that the EU would not be able to develop any meaningful collective foreign policy nor would it ever develop collective defense mechanisms. The EU would not become the foremost security structure in Europe; this role would be played by NATO<sup>67</sup>. His assessment was based on the fact that the EU’s capabilities in the form of the

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<sup>64</sup> Helsinki European Council Conclusions, pp.10.

<sup>65</sup> For a discussion of the possible variants of constructivism see Christiansen T et.al: “*The Social Construction of Europe*” in *Journal Of European Public Policy*, vol.6\4 special issue, pp.528-544, 1999.

<sup>66</sup> The point I am making here is one shared by most constructivists. It is highly counter-productive to continue the family feud between rationalists and post-modernists in IR. Instead one should acknowledge the utility of both approaches and be appreciative of the fact that in a diversity of approaches, the discipline will probably acquire more knowledge, not less. See Lapid Y: “*The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-Positivist Era*”, in *International Studies Quarterly*, vol.33, pp.235-254, 1989.

<sup>67</sup> Hill C: “*Closing the Capabilities-Expectations Gap*” in “*A Common Foreign Policy for Europe: Competing Visions of the CFSP*”, pp.37, 1998.

ability to use force, to utilize technology and mobilize its wealth was not sufficient for the expectations that were raised following the signing of TEU. My constructivist response to this is twofold. First, based on the discussion above, why does the EU need material forces to have a foreign policy? There are many examples of small states such as Mauritius that have virtually no material forces and yet no one would dispute that they had a foreign and security policy<sup>68</sup> Moreover if one examines where the EU is most active internationally, then the policies within the first pillar and especially the common commercial policy becomes far more important in terms of foreign policy. The collective understandings of building and maintaining a huge common market has reshaped the identities and interests of the member states so that a single foreign economic policy is not only possible but is in evidence today<sup>69</sup>. Secondly, a rationalist account (such as the CEG) has no conception of the possibilities that past actions can have on the constraints or possibilities for the present<sup>70</sup>. All of the joint declarations, common positions and legal treaties form what has been termed the “acquis politique” of the EU and as such this “acquis” creates possibilities (and constraints) for a common foreign policy to develop within the short and middle term as opposed to the long term predictions (if a common foreign policy is predicted at all) favored by rationalist accounts. My belief is that a social structure of friendship has been created by past political cooperation in Europe that will now provide the framework of possibility for a common foreign and security identity to develop thereby creating a true common foreign and security policy. Therefore it is “expectations” that should be the main focus of any analysis of the CFSP. These expectations are of course based on “capabilities”, but one needs to peel away the top layer of analysis and dig deeper and ask the question: Has a change in expectations created a reconstitution of identity and interests?

To conclude this discussion, I would like to stress that I am not trying to make hard and definite claims about the current state of affairs in the field of European political cooperation. Instead this entire discussion has been about how to improve upon the existing scholarship on EU foreign and defense policy studies and in a more general sense, integration studies. My argument is not that ideas matter more than material forces, however I take the view that there is too much squabbling between dogmatic academics that refuse to see the other side’s point of view (this is an excellent example of negative symbolic interactionism perpetuating and re-producing existing competitive rivalries within the academic community). My view is based on an attempt to bridge the intellectual camps. Rationalist accounts can explain many interesting things in social life, but so can ideational accounts. Thus as Wendt has argued, research should be about asking questions first then utilizing methods second<sup>71</sup>.

Assuming that a Kantian culture of friendship has developed in the EU can say a lot about how Europe will develop. Friendship after all is predicated on the belief that the relationship will continue and perhaps even deepen with a possible endpoint of a shared understanding of a collective, familial relationship. Constructivism is agnostic as to whether such an endpoint will occur, identities can remain stable or they can change. Whether identities change or remain fixed is dependent on both the shape of social structures as well as the practices of agents. Nevertheless, constructivism does provide the possibility for such a trajectory, unlike rationalist accounts which hold actor’s interests and identities constant. I have tried to show how EU member states created one kind of social structure through their interaction over time, the next step is to pinpoint the causal mechanism which will bring about structural change at the macro-level, or otherwise, how a common identity is instantiated. One possible answer is that the EU itself, as a distinct actor (meaning the central organs such as the European Court or Commission) has sufficient

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<sup>68</sup> Smith H: “*Actually Existing Foreign Policy or Not? The EU in Latin and Central America*” in “A Common Foreign Policy for Europe?”, pp.152-168, 1998.

<sup>69</sup> Smith M: “*Does the Flag Follow Trade? ‘Politicization’ and the Emergence of a European Foreign Policy*” in “A Common Foreign Policy for Europe” pp.77-94, 1998.

<sup>70</sup> This is the difference between “problem-solving” and “critical” theories. See Cox R: “*Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory*” in Keohane R.O (ed.): “Neorealism and its Critics”, Columbia University Press, New York, pp.204-254, 1986.

<sup>71</sup> Wendt A: “Social Theory of International Politics”, pp.377, 1999.

power to act as a “norm entrepreneur”<sup>72</sup> which within a particular social structure acts as a catalyst for structural change whereby many actors begin to internalize the new norms and ideas. Such a notion can only be conceptualized through a constructivist framework and it is these new avenues of research that will ultimately enrich our knowledge of European integration.

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